—which implies deterioration;—but we have to recognise that it is a deviation from the type. It certainly does not denote the ordinary sort of mind : probably it is a supergrowth; in some respects, it certainly involves development beyond the ordinary limit, reached by typical minds. But there is the further probability that this supergrowth in one direction may involve an undergrowth in another; in fact, it is very often found that a genius is usually deficient in some faculty or other. To that extent he is perhaps diseased. He is not diseased just in the faculty in which he excels others; but in other faculties, he may be—in fact, usually is—deficient. A military genius is not infrequently found deficient in moral perception. An artistic genius may have defective powers of retention; and so forth. So, not only is genius a deviation from the type but also is very likely diseased in some faculty or other.
We may, therefore, take it as proved, that, genius is an aberration from the type; which implies, in the first place, that he has a defective body, and, in the second place, that he has a defective mind. Now, this mental defect raises another question : Is it the same sort of defect as we find in a criminal?
Heaven, it has been said, is partitioned from hell with a thin wall. Between crime and genius, even this thin wall, according to some, does not exist. Lombroso, for instance, suggests that genius and moral insanity have a common basis in epilepsy. Epilepsy or hysteria or brain-paralysis is immaterial; if moral insanity and genius have a common or even a kindred origin, then the chances are that they will not differ in kind, nor therefore in value.
We have seen a view of crime, which refers it to organic causes; we find a similar view of genius,—almost the self-same organic interpretation. Now arises the question about its moral value. Shall we have the same estimation for both? If genius is applauded, why not crime, too? And if crime is condemned, why not genius, too?
