Although there are crimes which verge on genius and evoke a similar admiration, and, although even murder may sometimes become a ‘fine art,’ still, according to ordinary judgment, crime is sub-normal, while genius is super-normal; and, morally speaking, the one is supermoral, while the other is submoral. Evidently, moral judgment condemns crime but excuses and even applauds genius. It seems to be presumed that moral judgment must stop with the ordinary man and must not attempt to soar or to clip the wings of genius.
In other words, although psycho-physically, both crime and genius sail in the same boat, yet in Ethics they meet with a different reception. Is this justified?
That genius claims to be supermoral and to be exempt from moral criticism altogether, is amply illustrated in the case of Art. Art, it has been said, is not amenable to moral judgment. If it is Art, that is enough. Morality is not to be looked for in it. And if the activity exhibited in Art is free from moral criticism, why not the agent, i.e, the Artist, too? Now, art is but one form of genius; if it is not subject to moral judgment, other forms of genius also need not be. In fact, we have such claims advanced on behalf of genius. The Super-man who has made such a violent entry into the present-day literature of Europe, embodies in their most impressive form, the claims of genius to be exempt from moral criticism. But until these claims are granted, we have to face the problem of evaluating genius in the light of its proved or presumed affinity with crime.
The problem arises in this way : Psycho-physically, crime and genius are shown to have a common basis : and moreover, each is frequently found in the company of the other; as crime may often assume the proportion of genius, so, genius too, not infrequently exhibits criminal propensities. That is to say, genius is a deviation not only from the physical type of health but also from the moral type. This is
