vague possibility of more than is present is directly felt.
Second, in the presence of this continuity of feeling, nominalistic maxims appear futile. There is no doubt about one idea affecting another, when we can directly perceive the one gradually modified and shaping itself into the other. Nor can there any longer be any difficulty about one idea resembling another, when we can pass along the continuous field of quality from one to the other and back again to the point which we had marked.
An image should appear at this position in the text. To use the entire page scan as a placeholder, edit this page and replace "{{missing image}}" with "{{raw image|Chance, love, and logic - philosophical essays (IA chancelovelogicp00peir 0).pdf/267}}". Otherwise, if you are able to provide the image then please do so. For guidance, see Wikisource:Image guidelines and Help:Adding images. |  |
+ Insistency
-|
|
| Future
-+
Past |
|
|
- Insistency
Third, consider the insistency of an idea. The insistency
of a past idea with reference to the present is a quantity
which is less the further back that past idea is, and rises to
infinity as the past idea is brought up into coincidence with
the present. Here we must make one of those inductive
applications of the law of continuity which have produced
