Page:Diplomacy and the War (Andrassy 1921).djvu/138

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OUR POLITICAL MISTAKES
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What good, however, could such declarations achieve as long as the official negotiations remained barren of results?

When the Italian Parliament met in February, it looked as if the Government and the leading politicians had agreed that Italy must acquire neutrality at our expense and even at the cost of a war.

An evil result of the distrust was Sonnino's demand on March 13, in which he suggested an immediate execution of the possible agreement, and the fixing of a period of fifteen days for the negotiations.

The tactics of delay brought about a gradual change in the problem itself. In the beginning we had to come to an understanding with the Italian Government. In April, however, we had to negotiate over the heads of the Government with the Parliamentary majority. This problem was, of course, more difficult than the previous one, but it was not insoluble. The majority still seemed to want peace. The war involved such risk that anyone who was not a fanatic naturally fought shy of it. The Catholic party, the Social Democrats, the workmen and the majority of the peasants wanted to avoid the war. The King did not desire the war either. The possibility of peace, therefore, still existed, even against the will of the Government. Just at this time Venizelos, who had agitated for war, fell in Athens, and the love of peace of the brave King gained a victory over the policy of the Government. Was it not possible that the same should occur in Rome?