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INTRODUCTION
xix.

boasts of it in his "Memoirs": "The- Germans are not building in this feverish haste to fight you! No! it's the daily dread they have of a second Copenhagen, which they know a Pitt or a Bismarck would execute on them. Cease building or I strike." Talk of Prussian, intolerance! There was panic on both sides. Yet Britain could display an avenue of 18 miles of ships before the admiring gaze of the Tsar of all the Russias (1909). For our secret co-partnership with France in war preparations, arising out of the secret Morocco deal, had been gradually drawing us within the tentacles of the Russian octopus, as was bound to be the case.

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The secret deal was to be again threatened before its final accomplishment. The French opined that the time had come to give the coup de grâce to Moorish independence. Thirty thousand troops converged on Fez, the capital, hastening to the rescue of Europeans who did not require rescuing.[1] They would leave, the assurance was given, directly the work of rescue had been completed.

    sea which could have secured us against any conceivable enemy. We were not satisfied. We said: 'Let there he Dreadnoughts.' … Well, let me put another consideration before you which I don't think is sufficiently pointed out. We always say we must have what we call a 'two-Power Standard.' What does that mean? You must have a Navy large enough to oppose a combination of any two naval Powers. So, if we had Russia and France, Germany and Italy, we should always have a Fleet large enough to defend our shores against any combination of the two greatest naval Powers in Europe. This has been our standard. Look at the position of Germany. Her Army is to her what our Navy is to us—her sole defence against invasion. She has not a two-Power standard. She may have a stronger Army than France, than Russia, than Italy, than Austria, but she is between two great Powers, who, in combination, could pour in a vastly greater number of troops than she has. Don't forget that, when you wonder why Germany is frightened at alliances and understandings and some sort of mysterious workings which appear in the Press, and hints in the Times and Daily Mail… Here is Germany in the middle of Europe, with France and Russia on either side, and with a combination of armies greater than hers. Suppose we had had a possible combination which would lay us open to invasion—suppose Germany and France, or Germany and Austria, had Fleets which, in combination, would be stronger than ours. Would we not be frightened; would we not build; would we not arm? Of course we should. I want our friends, who think that because Germany is a little frightened she really means mischief to us, to remember that she is frightened for a reason which would frighten us under the same circumstances."

  1. See Note 25, Part VI. of the Despatches.