They remained. Once more Germany challenged the issue. Once again the three peoples were flung into the cockpit of violent and confused controversy. Once again the "German war" loomed in the offing.[1] Naval and military steps were taken. Mr. Lloyd George, in a new rôle, made an incendiary speech at the Guildhall from a half sheet of notepaper supplied by the Foreign Office. Europe hovered on the brink of war. Finally Morocco disappeared down the French gullet, and Germany, barely saving her face with "compensation" provided in African jungles, nursed her wounded pride in furious dudgeon. The Great War had advanced another stride towards its consummation.
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The unfolding of this story, or as much of it as was diplomatically accessible in those years, can be followed in the Belgian despatches from 1905 to 1910–11. That is why the historic interest of these documents for the British people is so considerable. Their most notable characteristic is the severity with which British diplomacy is judged; and especially the personal diplomacy of Edward VII. Yet these documents emanated from the official representatives of a small country which, in the event of a European war, had at least as much reason to fear Germany as they had to fear France: for German military strategy in a general war between the two great European rival Groups of Powers was a matter of common public discussion among military experts. Is their attitude to be explained by mere bias against Britain? The reader must draw his own conclusions. But two facts will not escape his notice. The first is the danger which the writers apprehend for Belgium should war eventuate. This fear is implicit and often vocal throughout the despatches. That is their constant anxiety and they criticise our diplomacy mainly because they feel that it is tending to make the war which they dread for their country. This is a very important point. The second is the persistence and unanimity with which the
- ↑ Mr. Winston Churchill, speaking at Dundee on June 5, 1915, declared that "he was sent to the Admiralty in 1911 after the Agadir crisis had nearly brought us into war, and he was sent with the express duty laid upon him by the Prime Minister to put the Fleet in a state of instant and constant readiness for war in case we were attacked by Germany." Germany was not in a position to attack us. Our naval force was overwhelmingly superior in every respect, (See Fisher's "Memoirs.")
