was extremely bad for them commercially and it was extremely bad more broadly. So we have worked with them for a new protocol which means that if they detect or we detect . . . but more likely they will [see] material online which looks like live streaming of a terrorist attack, they will immediately take it down and we have seen that work now in practice. It needs to get more sophisticated because, again, technology will stay ahead of us in some areas but it is an important step forward and one I would have thought five years ago, without GIFCT, we would have really struggled to achieve.[1]
271. Homeland Security Group pointed to the way that it, together with the CTIRU unit, was able to leverage the relationships it had built over the years with some of these CSPs in ensuring the Christchurch material was taken down. It was also supporting the CSPs to develop their capabilities:
For instance, following the March 2019 Christchurch attack in New Zealand, during which the livestreamed attack video was disseminated across the internet at an unprecedented rate, OSCT [Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism] utilised established CSP relationships to ensure CTIRU referrals of online terrorist content were prioritised and swiftly reviewed for removal.[2]
272. Whilst the GIFCT would certainly appear to have been a step in the right direction, there is still a lot more that the CSPs can and should be doing to tackle the online threat, as Homeland Security Group acknowledged:[3]
Homeland Security Group continues to work closely with the GIFCT and its individual members to press for a more robust, industry-wide approach to tackling terrorism online. The Christchurch attack demonstrated that progress made since the GIFCT's establishment did not effectively translate into an expeditious or coordinated cross-industry response in the event of a terrorist attack.
The UK worked with international partners to press the GIFCT to establish itself as a formal NGO entity with a clear organisational structure and future work programme. One such is the establishment of a crisis response protocol, which has been established and was successfully triggered following the Halle attack in Germany. The UK now sits on the GIFCT's new Independent Advisory Board, the formal mechanism for Governments and Civil Society organisations to hold the GIFCT to account for tackling online terrorist content.
The UK is also pressing for the GIFCT to ensure its crisis protocol is further improved by including non GIFCT members and comprehensively tackling the viral dissemination of all terrorist content as well as livestreamed video content.
108
