Wider work with communication service providers
273. More broadly, HMG continues in its efforts to drive forward reform in what Homeland Security Group acknowledged is "still an ungoverned space".[1] HMG has consistently pressed CSPs to develop and utilise automated technology to proactively detect and remove terrorist content. The Head of CTP observed that the major CSPs were now looking to them for technical assistance, and told the Committee that "we were approached by Facebook to help them develop their algorithm to be able to take this down".[2] In addition, CTP advised that the Metropolitan Police are using police training footage to aid Facebook in developing tools to better detect live-streamed terrorist attacks.[3]
274. Homeland Security Group has led work with CSPs on candidate security, focusing on tackling the online abuse received by candidates in the run up to the 12 December 2019 election, some of which was Extreme Right Wing in nature. They maintain that CSPs have improved their processes for referring and removing online abuse content where it is illegal or breaches CSPs Terms of Service. In this context, Homeland Security Group have worked with CSPs to ensure online threat to life or content inciting violence is clearly reported to the police and that platform trends are shared with HMG, in order to ensure that CSPs provide information for intelligence and evidence purposes (and that content is left up when needed for ongoing investigations).
275. The Home Office is currently looking to develop a technological solution to reduce the number of shares terrorist attack videos receive after they have been livestreamed. The solution would seek to improve current hash detection techniques used by industry, allowing CSPs to proactively identify more manipulated videos.
Why ERWT online is a new challenge
276. Whilst the approach to the assessment of the ERWT threat is notably 'threat agnostic,' the reality is that tackling ERWT online increasingly requires a different approach from how the Government has traditionally tackled Salafi-Jihadist online propaganda:
- In contrast to Daesh and Al-Qaeda, right-wing communities in the online sphere are increasingly fluid, with few formal organisations and structures. There are fewer ERWT proscribed groups and less group-aligned propaganda than in the Salafi-Jihadist space; and
- The style of content and the way in which it manifests (for example, within coded anonymised messaging), means that detecting, moderating and removing ERWT online content can be particularly difficult. This makes it more difficult for the Intelligence Community and law enforcement to help CSPs develop automated tools to effectively tackle ERWT content on their platforms.
277. Online ERWT content sits amidst a plethora of content that falls below illegal terrorist thresholds. In addition, a significant proportion of ERWT online content manifests on platforms that make moderation particularly challenging (for example, by ensuring the
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