she said they would be paid for by Belgium after the war. The impossibility, however, for Belgian industry to go on without capital obliged the governor-general to seek some solution. On April 2 1915 a Caisse de prits (loan bank) was established at Brussels to make advances on the security of the requisition vouchers. For requisitions made by the army, prices were fixed by the military authorities; for other requisitions valuation was made by the indemnity office in Berlin. The Caisse de prcts might advance 75% of such valuation, if the claimant accepted the price offered. The Caisse de prets merely gave a voucher, which the Societe Generale de Belgique was required to cash; the latter in return being granted by the Reichsbank a credit equal to the sums disbursed, but not to be drawn upon until three months after the signature of peace. The Societe Generale vigorously resisted this measure: on the one hand, be- cause the payment of the enormous number of German requisition vouchers must produce an inflation of the fiduciary circulation, with the immediate result of raising the cost of living and in- creasing poverty; on the other hand, because the Societe Gene- rale objected to helping Germany in her requisitions. The So- ciete Generale never consented to cash any vouchers save those issued for requisitions of raw materials. As claimants usually refused to accept the prices fixed by Berlin, the total of the loans granted did not exceed 75 millions of marks.
Requisitions were not confined to industry alone. In all private houses objects of copper, bronze, metal alloys and wool mattresses were seized. The following table shows the requisi- tions made in the area of General Government during the second half of 1917:
Objects.
Copper and alloyed metals from private houses .
Copper from industrial estab- lishments ....
Zinc
Lead
Tin
Steel ....'..
Iron from demolitions .
Copper
Sulphate of copper .
Lead (different forms) .
Rough zinc ....
Cadmium
Silver
Chemical products: Sulphuric acid
Soda
Chloride of lime . Muriatic acid
Paper
Skins of large cattle calves horses
sheep .... various animals rabbits
Tanning-materials .
Leather and leather straps
Boots and shoes
" " " wooden soled
Osier (wicker) for munition baskets
Osier fibre
Wool and hair
Mattress wool
Wool yarn
Woollen rags
Cotton rags
Manufactured cottons .
Cotton and cotton thread
Cottons, confiscated, various.
Manufactured flax and prod- ucts
Hemps and jute
Coconuts and piassava .
Brushes
Strings
Transmission cables
Jute bags
Quantity requisitioned during second half of 1917.
2,069,300 kgm.
3,975.8oo
38,870,854
3,967,970
6,600
21,000
140,000,000
5,576,375
481,414
12,309,842
6,225,147
768
3,197
20,877-7 tons 6,065-0 ' 570-0 ' 886-5 " 270-0 ' 151,664 pieces 60,624 " 12,868 27,710 173,710 1,227,819 4,987,000 kgm. (value of 4,915,000 mk.) ( ' 4,251.955 " )
( 79,948 " )
800 tons 165 " 840,270 kgm. 831,685 200,273 1,748,261 5,009,772 301 ,032 3,152 36,694
224,014
5,748 150,112 916,333 pieces 171.119 kgm.
8,424 574,173 pieces
9,5oo
7,000
24,000
copper from factories
private houses
Up to June 1918 there had been requisitioned: 290,000 tons of iron 7,000 3,5oo
copper produced in Belgium lead
" in different forms, produced in Belgium zinc and also 8,550,330 marks worth of leather and leather straps.
Producers were obliged to deliver their total output to the " Central " at very low prices. The " Central," after having supplied the army and the railways, resold the surplus at very high prices to the factories which were authorized to work. Two offices for the distribution of coal to the Belgian population were established at Brussels and Namur, but the quantity allotted for this purpose was quite insufficient. Indeed, the Kohlen- zentrale tried to export as much coal as possible to neutral coun- tries, for the sake of the large profits realized in that way.
In 1915 the export of Belgian coal to Germany reached 115% of the pre-war figure, in 1916 95%, in 1917 25%. Germany, on her side, imported approximately equivalent amounts of coal into Belgium.
The export to neutral countries was much greater, being in 1915 190% of the pre-war figure, in 1916 230%, in 1917 tailing to 90%. The exportation of Belgian coal seemed to Germany a lucrative operation. At the meeting of the Economic Com- mission on June 19 1915 Kardoff, representing German trade, declared: " The coal production of Belgium must first supply military requirements and afterwards Belgian consumption. The surplus must serve German purposes, notably as an export to neutral countries." This was the accepted doctrine.
In 1917 the distribution of Belgian coal was as follows:
1st
quarter.
2nd quarter.
3rd quarter.
4th quarter.
Belgian population and authorized industries . Troops and railways Occupied French terri- tories .... Export ....
53-0% 37-5%
o-5% 9-o%
43-50% 47-50%
0-25% 8-75%
44-50% 49-75%
5-75 .',
46% 52%
2%
Military needs absorbed 4,665,975 tons, one-half of the total output. Thanks to the Kohlenzenlrale's monopoly, the profits realized by it were large. The figures are as follows:
Profit on sales.
1915
marks.
1916 marks.
1917 marks.
In Germany .... " Switzerland " Scandinavia " Holland ....
972 340,892 1,688,646 705,693
48,619 5,856,376 10,547,467 5,542,120
176,110 3,498,449
2,557,033 2,956,870
The total profits for the three years amounted to about 34 millions of marks, which were used as a German war loan.
An oil " Central " on the same model was established on June 3
1915. It realized a profit of 11,815,266 francs in the years 1915,
1916, 1917; 6-5 millions of which were for 1917 alone. Finally, on July 26 1915 the " Central " for water, gas and electricity was instituted, important services thus being placed under the direct control of the German administration.
The German Government now controlled all the elements indispensable to industry. Henceforth no undertaking could escape its power. Industry was forced into absolute submission to the terms imposed by the invader.
The Belgian marine export trade had, of course, been stopped by the war. Belgian factories closed down one after the other and the numbers of unemployed quickly became enormous. The Comite National, whose activities will be described later, organized relief measures, got work of public utility started, and established bourses de travail (labour scholarships), which, while supporting the unemployed person, exacted meantime his attendance at technical classes. The German authorities in- tervened in 1915 and opposed this great organization for assisting the unemployed.
It was soon realized that the only efficacious method of helping the Belgian masses was to revive trade, and in Aug. 1915 a
