troops, who never had any rest, and led to a lamentable inter- mixture of the various units.
The commander of the II. Army, whose first care was the .consolidation of his line by means of reserves, proposed to assem- ble his reenforcements secretly around Cisna, thence, in con-
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FIG. C.
junction with the III. Army's right wing to strike in the direction of Wola-Michowa, and immediately afterwards to deliver with his concentrated forces a crushing blow northwards from both sides of Baligrod. The attack on Wola-Michowa was intended to recapture Lupkow station, the junction of a narrow-gauge railway running behind the front of the II. Army. 1 The recovery of this line would considerably facilitate the supplying of that army, the bulk of which was dependent on a single practicable road, of which the condition had alarmingly deteriorated owing to the unusually early thaw. Meanwhile it was no longer possible to ignore the urgent need of support for the W. wing of the army. On Feb. 16 the 16,000 men of the XIX. Corps on this flank were faced by 28,000 Russians, and a division had to be brought into line on the 2oth, and another on the 23rd. 2 Not only was the opportunity of surprising the enemy lost, but they were allowed still further time to take counter-measures by the postponement of the Austrian attack on account of the condi- tion of the roads.
The critical position of Przemysl and the continuing concen 1 - tration of the IX. Russian Army facing the Austrian E. flank induced the Austrian high command to press for an immediate offensive. The Russians had also detached troops from the IX. Army (II. Cav. Corps and nth Div.) to strengthen Lechitski's army, and the transference thither of other forces from the Nida front (XVII. Corps, 3rd and 35th Divs.) was also probable. In view of the disposition of the railways the only possible method of assisting Pflanzer-Baltin's army group was for the II. Army to attract to its own sector, by means of an early attack, as many hostile troops as possible. This course would consider- ably increase the difficulties of the II. Army, the special task of which was the relief of Przemysl; but its considerable numer- ical superiority over its enemies seemed to the Central Powers to afford a prospect of success. South of the Vistula there stood 3oi Russian divisions (exclusive of those investing Przemysl) as against 49 Austrian and German divisions; though many of the Austrian divisions had, it is true, been reduced to little more than the strength of infantry regiments. Every attempt was made to assemble superior forces in the decisive sector, from the Dukla pass to E. of Cisna. In the first few days of March, 17 divisions could be opposed to 7 or 8 Russian divisions, if the reenforcements sent to the II. Army were utilized on the W. wing. In addition, one division from the IV. and one from the I. Army 3 were used here, bringing up the total of fresh divi-
1 From E. to W., V., XVIIT and XIX. Corps and later IV. Corps. S 4ist Honved Div. on Feb. 20; 27th Diy. on the 23rd.
- I3th Landwehr and I4th Divs. respectively.
sions to six and a half. The remainder were in many cases dead tired. Under these conditions the offensive of the III. Army which was ordered at the same time could hardly be very effec- tive, and the main burden of the fighting fell to the II. Army.
Misfortune pursued it, however, from the first. The peril of Przemysl necessitated working to a time limit and in other ways exercised a powerful influence on decisions taken. The increasing difficulty in the matter of supplies led to the opening of the attack on Feb. 27, before the concentration was complete, and to the choice of the direction of Baligrod for the line of attack as being " the shortest road to Przemysl " ; while the action planned against Lupkow was in the end abandoned owing to the loss of time in- volved. The Russians, entrenched in their strong snow fortresses, were able continually to bring up reenforcements strong enough to deny to the group under Gen. von Terszstyansky, advancing astride the Baligrod road, that decisive initial success which later experience in war has shown to be so important in attempts to break through the enemy's line.
Immediately after the opening of the offensive, the tempera- ture sank once more to 13 F. below zero. The troops lost heavily from this cause and also from the methods of combat adopted; these latter were conditioned mainly by the necessity of bringing speedy help to the garrison of Przemysl, and the universal idea that this must be achieved at all costs led too often to massed infantry attacks against barbed wire without sufficient artillery preparation. A week had elapsed and no ground had been gained beyond the initial advance of 10 m. in depth astride the Baligrod road. On March 5 the High Command therefore ordered a gen- eral attack along the whole Carpathian front. The S. wing of the IV. Army 4 was to advance on the 6th by Gorlice in the direction Jaslo-Zmigrod. This had already been recognized by the Aus- trian higher command as the weakest spot in the Russian line, but even now it had not sufficient forces available to enable it to make full use of this knowledge. The attack was delayed till the 8th, and succeeded in pinning the Russian forces to their ground; parts of von Woyrsch's army detachment and the IX. German Army attacked N. of the Vistula with the same object between March 6 and 9.
During the next few days the III. and Southern Armies carried out no important operations. The II. Army attacked with all its forces along the whole of its front, between March 5 and 10. In spite of this the Russians, by the loth, had succeeded in bringing into action forces equal to those of their assailants; they were able with the advantage of strong mountain posi- tions to oppose to the 112,000 rifles of the II. Army about the same number. On the decisive W. wing they had from 21,000 to 28,000 fresh rifles in reserve as against 13,000 fresh Aus- trian rifles. 6 This was decisive, for the II. Army was by now
RUSSIAN COUNTER OFFENSIVE IN EAST GALICIA
J
FIG. D.
completely exhausted. Its losses between March i and 15 amounted to 51,000 men (over a third of its total strength on March i). 6 Two-thirds of these casualties 855 officers and
4 Lt. -Field-Marshal von Arz's group. 6 1 4th Div.
Total strength on March i, inclusive of divisions still en route: 148,850.
