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APRIL. 1915
FIG. E.
37, 205 other ranks 1 had been suffered by Terzstyansky's group, only some 70,000 strong.
The offensive of the II. Army culminated on March 10. The Russian counter-offensive, 2 commencing on the nth with a flank attack by Wola-Michowa, checked the attack astride the Baligrod road, and on the I4th it had to be abandoned as hopeless.
The offensive wedge of the II. Army had acted as a magnet to some 51 Russian divisions. Among these were the 35th and 3rd Divs. so that the object of relieving the pressure on Pflanzer- Baltin's front had been achieved.
General Lechitski had commenced his offensive against this group with four corps on Feb. 28, and the Austrian right wing, outnumbered, had fallen back, fighting stubbornly, to N. of Obertyn. Thanks to the timely arrival on March 4 of the XI. Corps from the IV. Army, Pflanzer-Baltin's troops succeeded in holding their new front, although the Russians had by the icth advanced in N. Bukovina as far as the Pruth. On March 18 their offensive against the Austrian E. wing came to a standstill.
The relief of Przemysl had thus proved impossible. However, in order to assist the garrison in its attempt to cut its way out, by holding fast as many Russian troops as possible, a striking force was assembled, despite all obstacles, on the E. wing of the II. Army. There could be however no question of cooperating with the garrison, as the sortie attempted on the ipth broke down while still within the fortress area, all stocks of food being ex- hausted; a capitulation was signed on the 22nd after all war material had been as far as possible destroyed.
The failure of the attempts to relieve Przemysl much dis- couraged the Austrian troops, particularly those of the II. Army. Their endurance and self-sacrifice, however, were not entirely in vain. The attention of the Grand Duke Nicholas had been so riveted on the danger threatening him to the S. of Przemysl that he lost sight of the duty of cooperating with the Western Allies of Russia, and decided to attempt a break-through into Hungary with the forces now assembled to the S. of Przemysl. This was quite in accordance with the wishes of the Austrian and German high commands, which up to that time had sought to defend Germany by continuous attacks in the Carpathians. The strong Russian forces now directed against Hungary were being enticed
1 Killed and wounded . . Sick Prisoners
Missing
Total i.e. 54% of the total strength.
340 officers 415
31
33 " 855 officers
17,210 other ranks 1 1 .098
i,i94 "
7.703
37,205 other ranks 2 25,000 Russians against 17,400 rifles of the XIX. Corps.
into a region where in winter, as had recently been proved, full advantage could not be taken of superiority of numbers, a superi- ority easier in the circumstances to destroy than to maintain.
The last great attempt of the Russians to break through began on March 20 with an onslaught of unexampled violence against the whole front of the III. Army, which, despite all it could do, was gradually forced farther back in the direction of Hungary. Units of the IV. Army 3 arriving on the 28th toree'n- force the left wing brought the attackers to a stand; but against the centre and right of the army the Russians continued their attacks with ever-fresh forces, and it was obvious that their object was to break through towards Varanno and Homonna, the most northerly points of the Hungarian plain. This caused the utmost anxiety to the II. Army command. As early as the 23rd a gap existed between the left flank of that army and the retreating right of the III., and although, itself heavily pressed, the II. Army had no option but to put in some march battalions 4 to fill it. Again on the 26th, at a time when its own front was weakening rapidly, the army dispatched a combined brigade 6 from its W. wing, and one infantry 6 and one cavalry brigade 7 from its E. wing to the III. Army. (The infantry were sent back later.) Any further successes against the right of the III. Army must have seriously menaced the position of the II. Army stationed N. of the frontier ridge. On the 27th, accordingly, the army command proposed a voluntary withdrawal; but the high command, which throughout these days of dire peril still held firmly to its offensive projects, refused its assent, as the blocking of the Laborcz valley by the German Beskiden Corps 8 (4th Ger- man Div. of the Southern Army, 2$th Res. Div. of the IX. Army, 35th Res. Div. of Woyrsch's group) had been begun.
Meantime, however, the Russians at the end of March had driven the II. Army to retreat. The system of constantly patch- ing the front with troops withdrawn from other sectors was no longer possible, in view of the fact that the enemy's attacks were now simultaneous all along the army line. The lack of good roads prevented these reserves arriving in time or in sufficient num- bers to gain isolated successes. The Russians, being superior in numbers, were able to seize the opportunity afforded by the withdrawal of reserves from the centre of the II. Army at Cisna to drive in its front in that sector. Here they seriously menaced
3 Parts of the 26th Landwehr and 8th Div.
4 Col. Biffl s combined brigade.
5 Lt. -Field-Marshal Martiny's combined brigade.
6 1 28th Honved Brigade.
7 ist Landsturm Hussar Brigade.
8 Beskiden, i.e. the range of the Carpathians separating East Galicia from Hungary.
