Powers: either (a) to concentrate as much as possible of the
German army in the E. (relying upon the short and well-forti-
fied defensive line of Lorraine and Alsace, doubled by the Saar
and the Rhine, to hold up the French) , and to take the offensive
with go or 95 divisions, German and Austro-Hungarian, as
soon as possible so as to catch the enemy in the act of detrain-
ment ; or else (6) to stand on the defensive, each in his own theatre
of war, resigned to give up territory in order to gain time for the
annihilation of the French.
But that annihilation effort would require at least four-fifths of the German mobilizable forces, if it were to be carried out in the short time that the conditions of the E. allowed, and in the case of Germany the territory that would have to be resigned was E. Prussia, bound indissolubly to the Hohenzollerns and to the Prussian army by ties of sentiment and tradition. Its abandonment was " unthinkable." Yet the force that could be spared to defend it was small indeed. The Reichstag had de- clined to sanction the creation of the three new army corps which would have eased the problem; and, in the event, one to two corps allotted in principle to the E. were taken at the last moment for the W. In short, the German army allotted to the E. was a minimum force. But it was not on that account authorized to give up any German ground.
The case of Austria-Hungary was more favourable to this extent, that nearly the whole force of the Dual Monarchy could be employed in the defence of Galicia, unless (as actually hap- pened) offensive action was simultaneously undertaken in the Serbian theatre. On the other hand, Galicia would clearly be the enemy's principal target, and were he to leave mere flank guards against E. Prussia, there was little doubt that even in an accelerated offensive he could employ superior forces. Many Austrian authorities therefore favoured a withdrawal of the line of defence to the Carpathians, and probably the majority con- sidered that nothing could be held in advance of the San-Dniester barrier. The problem then was difficult and obscure, and dif- ferences of opinion both within each country and between the two countries themselves were- certain. Austria's strategy even in respect of her local problems depended largely upon Germany's, and no definite, binding convention appears to have been negotiated, either for the case of the offensive or for that of the defence. More, the interchange of views which did take place led to completely disjointed action. When the inner wing of the Austro-Hungarians was driving forward the offen- sive on Lublin and Chelm, the Germans in E. Prussia were under orders to retreat to the Vistula.
Conrad von Hotzendorff, the head of the Austrian general staff, was essentially active in temperament, and the wave of sentiment in favour of the undiluted offensive which swept through all European armies about 1912 strongly influenced him and his entourage. A scheme was prepared under which the left portion of the Austro-Hungarian army was to take the offensive from the lower San, northward on Lublin and Chelm, flank-guarded by an echelon directed on Vladimir Volynsk, while the right portion defended Lemberg against attack from the E. In cooperation with this left wing, a German army was to advance by Mlava on the Narew line, force this, and effect a junction with the Austrian advance about Siedlce. By this scheme it was hoped either to cut off a part of the Russian army and beat other parts in detail as they detrained if the Russians were attempting to forward concentration or to make good military occupation of almost the whole of Poland in the short- est time if they were concentrating on the rear line Kovno- Brest. At the lowest, Conrad held, the protection of Galicia and of E. Prussia would be best assured by the offensive.
In how far Moltke agreed to this plan is doubtful. He had definitely committed himself to the Schlieffen scheme of putting France out of action before an eastern front came into existence, and though he had considerably altered its details, he had pro- vided even less force for E. Prussia than Schlieffen had proposed. Such evidence as is available tends to show that Moltke agreed with the scheme as the operative idea of the eastern offensive that was to follow the decisive defeat of France (expected to
have been sufficiently achieved by about the 3oth day of mobili- zation), but not as a preventive offensive to be launched while the issue in France was still undecided. Conrad, on the other hand, was determined to carry it out the moment he was ready, hoping, as he said, that Moltke would not "leave him sitting in the ink too long." The scale of the operation for him was only that of a preventive offensive, carried out substantially by about 27 Austro-Hungarian and 10 German divisions from the San and from the Mlava region respectively. This force, if it caught the Russians in the act of concentration, would create " favour- able conditions for later operations " on a large scale.
Moltke, on the contrary, gave the E. Prussian Army (VIII., Gen.-Oberst von Prittwitz und Gaffron) nine active and reserve divisions (I., XVII., XX. Active Corps, I. Res. Corps, 3rd Res. Div.), for both the lake and the Mlava fronts. Apart from a number of Ersatz and Landwehr formations, most of which were intended for the defence of Thorn, Graudenz and Konigsbcrg, this was all. In Posen province and in Silesia, there were only frontier guards of Landsturm, and the Landwehr and Ersatz garrisons of Breslau and Posen; as the salient facing these provinces was practically evacuated, no more was necessary, and indeed eight Landwehr regiments were grouped in Upper Silesia as a field force (the " Landwehr Corps," von Woyrsch) to accompany and guard the left of the Austrian offensive.
Thus, the first campaigns in the E. were distinct and without connexion of idea or of date. The battles of both being de- scribed elsewhere, it is sufficient here to outline the campaigns of Lemberg and Tannenberg in succession.
The Campaign in East Prussia; August-Sept. 1914. The first requirement of the Russian scheme of operations being free use of the northern corridor for the assembly of forces against the Austrian left, the troops disposed on the dangerous flank of the corridor were, ready for action about ten days before the date set for the completion of the Lublin-Chelm concentra- tion. In the original scheme, their mission was primarily defen- sive and in the second place offensive, but as early as Aug. 9 the Grand Duke determined to push forward both the I. and II. Armies on their offensive missions, in the hope of at once compelling the Germans to hold back forces destined for the W. On the I4th, their concentration completed, these armies moved out of the detrainment areas, the I. (II., III., IV. and XX. Corps) under Rennenkampf on the axes Kovno-Gumbinnen and Suwalki-Marggrabova, the II. (VI., XV., XXIII., XIII. and later I. Corps) under Samsonov on the axis Przusznysz-Soldau. Seven to eight cavalry divisions accompanied and preceded them. At many points on the frontier from Memel to Bialla and round to Mlava there had already been local engagements, especially on the axis Kovno-Gumbinnen, where Rennenkampf on the one side and von Francois (commander of the German I. Corps) on the other had both strong motives for activity, the Russians to thrust back the enemy's forces as far from the " corridor " as possible, the Germans to preserve the region be- tween the frontier and the lakes as long as possible from occupa- tion or pillaging. On the Mlava axis these episodes were fewer, for the Russian main bodies were more distant. The Germans were unable to prevent the enemy's mounted troops from ranging up to Soldau, but their Zeppelins reconnoitred the line of advance of Samsonov's main bodies.
Gen. von Prittwitz, in spite of his small forces, was confident. He placed the I. Corps (Francois) facing E. on and in front of the Angerapp, the XX. Corps facing S. between Allenstein and Soldau, the XVII. and I. Res. Corps and the 3rd Res. Div. in the interior, waiting on events. To the left rear of the I. Corps, the Konigsberg main reserve an Ersatz and Landwehr force numerically, but only numerically, equivalent to a corps moved out N. of the Pregel to Insterburg. To the right of the XX. Corps was a frontier guard, also composed of Ersatz and Landwehr belonging to the fortresses of Thorn and Graudenz. On Aug. 14 v. Prittwitz, satisfied that no important threat was impending on his S. front, turned over the defence of that front to the Landwehr and Ersatz formations of Gen. von linger, drew the XX. Corps to Ortelsburg, in readiness for an offensive to-
