wards Johannisburg, and brought the remainder of his forces to the E. front behind and on the flanks of the I. Corps, the 3rd Res. Div. (reenforced by one brigade and a screen of Landsturm posts) holding the lake barrier.
On the iyth took place the first serious encounter of large forces. Von Francois still maintained a forward position on the Kovno railway at Stalluponen, barely five miles inside the fron- tier; he was determined to defend offensively, and he inflicted a sharp blow on the central columns of the enemy before the others became effective. But his left was driven in, and Prittwitz, whose intention was by no means to fight so far forward, ordered the combat to be broken off and the troops to retire to the Gum- binnen position. There, on the igth and 2oth, the battle of Gumbinnen was fought. Claimed by both sides as a victory but in fact indecisive, since parts of each line gained successes or suffered failure, it ended in Prittwitz's ordering the battle to be broken off. To the astonishment of his corps commanders, he announced that he proposed to retreat over the Vistula. A grave crisis had arisen. The Russian II. Army, seemingly quiescent on the Narew, had in fact been cautiously advancing on the Mlava axis, which was now defended only by second- line troops and, partially, by the XX. Corps everything else, even mobile Landwehr brigades, having been brought over to the E. front by the order of the i4th. Such was the situation of the defences when, some time after noon on the 2oth, reports reached Prittwitz to the effect that four or more Russian corps were approaching Mlava and Ortelsburg. He had three alter- natives to disregard the threat, win an effective victory at Gumbinnen, and pursue the enemy in such a way as to impose caution on all Russian forces in advance of the sensitive point of the " corridor "; to leave a containing force about Gumbinnen, trust to the lake barrier, and bring back the bulk of the forces so as to strike the flank of the oncoming II. Army; or to fall back beyond the sweep of that army's manoeuvre. The first alternative was eagerly advocated by von Francois, but the other corps had met with little success in the battle. It is probable that no reasonable hope remained of winning a thorough vic- tory on the 2ist, and nothing less would serve. The second alternative was not, at that moment, considered and the third was adopted in its most extreme form, retreat beyond the Vis- tula. The I. Corps was to move by train to Bischofswerder and Gosslershausen, in order to bar the road to the Vistula, the XX. to fight for time, and the remainder to withdraw south- westward under cover of these corps. A factor in the decision was the activity of Russian cavalry which, in large and small bodies, was appearing in the interior of the province.
In the Kriegsspiel exercises of peace-time, this problem had often been fought out, and the idea of sacrificing E. Prussia on paper was familiar. But, as the elder Moltke observed in 1866, "in practice one does not abandon provinces." On the 2oth, apparently on the initiative of Lieut.-Col. Hoffmann of the staff of the VIII. Army, who sent a protest direct to supreme headquarters at Coblenz, Moltke communicated with Pritt- witz by telephone, and urged him to try the alternative of a manoeuvre on interior lines. The army commander replied that this was impossible and that he might need reinforcements even to secure an escape to the Vistula. Thereupon Moltke relieved him of his command, opened direct telephone com- munication with von Frangois and von Scholtz (XX. Corps) , tele- graphed to General-Oberst von Hindenburg, in retirement, to offer him the command, and summoned Ludendorff (deputy chief of staff II. Army) to act as chief of staff.
This situation, in fact, was less alarming than it had been on the 2 1 st. Neither Rennenkampf nor Samsonov displayed any important activity; and Prittwitz recovered confidence, decided to hold the line of the Passarge against Rennenkampf, and began to work out a scheme of attack against the Russian II. Army. But the order of dismissal reached him that evening.
On the 23rd Hindenburg and Ludendorff arrived at Marien- burg (H.Q. VIII. Army). Already, after a conversation with Moltke, Ludendorff had (apparently on a suggestion from Francois) fixed Deutsch-Eylau and eastward, instead of Goss-
lershausen, as the rendezvous of the I. Corps and ordered all available Ersatz and Landwehr units from Thorn and Grau- denz to strengthen von Unger, thus beginning to prepare a group of two active corps and other troops to check Samsonov. The other forces lately engaged at Gumbinnen were to remain, tem- porarily, opposing Rennenkampf all measures designed, evi- dently, to arrest the sense of retreat and panic. Not until the staff of the VIII. Army had reported the situation in detail was a clear idea of possibilities formed by the new leaders. In principle the plan was adopted of holding up Rennenkampf, maintaining the lake region against any break-in from Lomzha, and concentrating offensive effort on Samsonov. Both the newcomers and the staff already on the spot were in agreement as to this. But it remained to be seen whether, and even how, it was to be accomplished. On the evening of arrival, Hinden- burg reported to Coblenz " assembly of army at XX. Corps and enveloping attack planned for Aug. 26," but next evening, developing the idea in some details, he added : " moral determined but not impossible things turn out badly."
The intention was to disengage some, or even all, of the troops opposing Rennenkampf, and with them by a flank march close behind the lakes, to envelop Samsonov's right; to bring in the I. Corps and the nearest portions of von Unger's force against his left, and to hold him frontally with the XX. Corps. It was on this last that everything hinged. Short of a simulta- neous effort by both Rennenkampf and Samsonov the case feared by the Germans pressure by the II. Army alone was of greater significance than that of the I. Army alone would be. Rennenkampf, however active, could only drive the I. Res. and XVII. Corps south-westward towards the Passarge (and the Konigsberg troops into their fortress) and work a passage down the rear side of the lakes to join hands with Samsonov, whose VI. Corps was made to diverge towards Ortelsburg for that purpose. Samsonov, on the contrary, could by an energetic advance bring three corps (XIII., XV., XXIII.) against Scholtz, and in case of success break into the midst of the new dispositions of his opponent. On the 23rd- 24th this seemed probable, for on those days he attacked the XX. Corps and forced it to swing back from the line Gilgcnburg-Orlau to the line Gilgenburg-Hohenstein. At that moment the 3rd Res. Div. at Hohenstein and even the first arrivals of the I. Corps at D. Eylau were being drawn into the fight to assist von Scholtz. The arrival of the rest of the I. Corps, destined for the flank attack on the W., was delayed by misadventures; and this western attack (I. and Unger) was itself becoming imperilled by the advance of yet another Russian Corps, the I., from the IX. Army forming at Warsaw. Of the other German corps not one was disengaged for its southward march before the 24th.
On the 24th, however, the withdrawal from Rennenkampf's front began. It was carried out in the midst of an emigration en masse, main roads being so crowded with refugees that troops were marched in some cases entirely by tracks and by-roads. Russian cavalry parties were by now riding about the country as far as the Passarge.
The Angerapp line having been given up on the 22nd, the front of contact opposite the Russian I. Army now (24th) ran along the Deime and the lower Alle, astride the Pregel, to Allenburg, thence by Gerdauen to Angerburg at the N. end of the lakes. North of the Pregel, the Konigsberg force was slowly retiring on its fortress and had left Wehlau. South of it there were withdrawn, each in succession and covered by the rest, the XVII. Corps, which was directed on Bischofsburg-Ortelsburg; the I. Res. Corps, directed upon Seeburg; and finally the 6th Landwehr brigade from Lotzen, the key of the lakes, to the same region. Only the Konigsberg force, one cavalry brigade and some Landsturm, remained in front of the Russian I. Army.
Meantime, Samsonov continued his methodical advance, but very slowly the VI. Corps on Bischofsburg via Ortelsburg; the XIII. on Allenstein; while the other two, followed in echelon to the left rear by the I. Corps, were sent against Scholtz (2oth and 3rd Res. Div.), whose left was driven from Hohenstein. But already the two wings of the envelopment were being pre-
