in consciousness of her indebtedness to the great guaranteeing Powers, but from a clear perception of her vital interests as a nation, understood that her place was at the side of the Powers of the Entente; and that whereas in the war that was being waged it was not possible for her to take a military part, since she could not, owing to the danger from Bulgaria, reinforce the Serbians, much less send an expeditionary force to France, nevertheless she thought it her duty to declare to the Powers of the Entente that, if Turkey went to war against them, she placed all her forces naval and military at their disposal for the war against Turkey, always presupposing that she was to be guaranteed against the Bulgarian danger." 1 The results of this voluntary declaration, made at a time when the Germans were advancing triumphantly towards Paris, won an assurance from the British Government that the Turkish fleet would not be allowed to leave the Dardanelles, the consent of the three Powers and of Italy to the provisional reoccupation of northern Epirus by the Greek army, and a cordial telegram from King George V. of England to King Constantine. But shortly after- wards Admiral Mark Kerr, instructed by the British Admiralty to concert plans with the Greek staff for a possible occupation of Gallipoli, was surprised to be told by King Constantine that he had no intention in any circumstances of declaring war against Turkey unless Turkey first attacked Greece. Venizelos in a memorandum to the King (Sept. 7) explained the reasons for forestalling an inevitable Turkish attack, Turkey in her persecutions of the Greek element in Asia Minor " having long been waging a war which had never been declared ";he protested against the King's excessive fear of offending Germany; and finally offered to resign. He was induced to remain in office, but insisted on the resignation from the Government (Sept. 28) of M. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was understood to have advised the King without the knowledge of his colleagues; Streit indeed continued to be the private political counsellor at the Palace. A month later Turkey entered the war.
In Jan. 1915 England on behalf of the Allies once more invited Greek assistance, not against Turkey but for the relief of Serbia, by a well-meaning attempt to reconstitute the nascent Balkan federation of 1912. Serbia, in the hope of eventually reaching the Adriatic, was to secure Bulgarian cooperation by certain concessions in Macedonia; and if Greece would facilitate these concessions the three Powers would gladly acknowledge " the right of Greece to very considerable compensations on the coast of Asia Minor" (Jan. 24 1915). Venizelos, whose own policy had always tended whenever possible towards a Balkan federation, explained to King Constantine in a memorandum of Jan. ii the necessity of securing the cooperation not only of Rumania but of Bulgaria as well, and declared that in exchange for Bulgaria's active cooperation in a war which must result in " the creation of a real Magna Graeda " he would not hesitate to sacrifice Kavalla (the port in western Macedonia chiefly coveted by Bulgaria); and in a third memorandum (Jan. 17) he defined the territory in Asia Minor " a province of 125,000 sq. km. as large as and no less rich than the whole kingdom of Greece and containing 800,000 Greek inhabitants " which might be secured in exchange for the 2,000 sq. km. of the Kavalla district, the population of which need not necessarily be lost to Greece. These negotiations were frustrated primarily by the attitude of Bulgaria.
On Feb. 19, at the time of the preliminary attack by the British fleet on the Dardanelles, Venizelos, realizing that a landing force would be required, took up again the question of Greek cooperation. By a fourth memorandum (unpublished) he believed that he had succeeded in gaining the King's assent to the mobilization of one army corps to join in the Allied attack on Turkey, but he was checked by the immediate resigna- tion of Col. John Metaxas, chief of the general staff. He there- fore called a Crown Council of former premiers, under the presidency of the King (March 5), at which his proposal was favourably received by the leaders of all parties, including the
1 The exact terms of this declaration have never been published ; the text is taken from a speech of Venizelos in Aug. 1917.
ex-premiers Ralli and Dragoumes. At the suggestion of the ex-premier Theotokes a second Crown Council was held (March 6) in order to hear the reasons for the continued opposition of the general staff. At this meeting Venizelos, influenced by information from Constantinople (Feb. 29) that the Turks were already preparing to evacuate their still unfortified capital, attempted to meet the arguments of the general staff (against the denudation of the frontier of troops which might be required in view of the possibility of a Bulgarian attack), by proposing that not an army corps but only one division should be sent to the Dardanelles. This proposal was unanimously adopted by the Crown Council and even the ex-premier Theotokes, who never wavered in his personal preference for neutrality, advised the King that it was his dutyto follow the advice of the Govern- ment of Venizelos without further hesitation. Nevertheless, King Constantine refused, demanded the resignation of Venizelos (March 6), and dissolved the Chamber (April 10).
Venizelos in Conflict with the King. A new Government was formed on March 10 by D. Gounares, who declared that the basis of Greek policy in loyalty to Serbia would remain unaf- fected by the change of Government; and in the following month, when Bulgarian " irregulars " raided the Nish-Salonika railway, associated Greece with the Serbian protest at Sofia. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Zografos, " honestly adopted all that was possible of the Liberal policy, the foundation of which was a very benevolent neutrality towards the Entente with a firm determination never to allow a Bulgarian attack on Serbia " ; he continued for some weeks to negotiate with the Governments of the Entente, who on April 11 specifically offered the vilayet of Smyrna, but his sincere proposals were overtaken by the extravagant stipulations attached to them by the general staff. In the following month further offers of Greek cooperation were made through less formal channels, such as the suggestion (May 2) that Greece would lend the assistance of her fleet if guaranteed against Bulgarian attack. But the P'rench Govern- ment, to which at this period most of these offers were addressed, replied that all proposals of assistance must be unconditional. Other offers were left unanswered by the French and British Governments, which were convinced of the insincerity of these proposals; not only because the Government of Gounares had taken office on the specific programme of maintaining Greek neutrality, and was believed to be putting forward these sugges- tions (as ex-President Poincare subsequently stated on Dec. 9 1920) as a manoeuvre directed against the Liberal party on the eve of the elections; but also because the real government of the country had been taken over by the King, who from this time forward assumed the right of negotiating directly with foreign Powers either through their ministers in Athens or through his brothers, one of whom would be sent from time to time on a tour of the western courts.
King Constantine was at the beginning of the war honestly neutral, but his mind was overwhelmingly impressed by German military prestige, and influenced by the German training of some of the most capable officers of the general staff. He was convinced by sentiment and environment, in spite of the logic of Venizelos, that Germany was going to win. The German press propaganda, well organized under Baron Schenck, was meanwhile very active, and as Germany had nothing to hope for from Greece beyond her neutrality, it directed all its efforts not only to strengthen the politicians opposed to Venizelos but also to popularize the King's own person and policy. At the elections which were finally held on June 13 the voters were definitely told that a vote cast against Venizelos, against the Liberal party, meant a vote for their King and a vote for peace. It is therefore somewhat remarkable that although Venizelos himself took no part in the elections, his party, with a programme of intervention, won a majority of 58 seats in a house of 310. (In Old Greece alone they won 123 seats out of 184, but lost heavily in Macedonia.) .
In spite of this result Gounares remained in office. As the King had fallen ill, Gounares insisted that this precluded him from considering any change of policy that mighl; be necessitated
