by a change of Government; and the interval was used by the German propaganda which had now obtained a firm hold on a certain section of the press, in conjunction with the counsellors of German sentiment within the palace, to wean public opinion from the ideas of confidence in Venizelos and loyalty to Serbia. In July an agreement was signed between Turkey and Bulgaria, an agreement which was declared by The Times correspondent in the Balkans Quly 15) to be " of no political importance." The Greek press, less credulous, perceived the danger, and on Aug. 2 Gounares officially declared that " a Bulgarian attack on Serbia could not leave us indifferent, and the Turco-Bulgarian agreement will only strengthen the bonds between Greece and Serbia." Yet it is significant that on July 30 the Greek minister at Bucharest was informed by his English colleague that Germany had formally promised Bulgaria that Greek neutrality was definitely assured even in face of a Bulgarian attack on Serbia.
At last on Aug. 23 Venizelos was recalled to office. He had to face a strong opposition, composed of jealous party leaders, great provincial families, and local politicians whose positions had been endangered by the reforms of 1910-1; and this oppo- sition of personal hostility to Venizelos was cleverly utilized by the German propaganda, which had only to identify the policy of loyalty to Serbia and to the protecting Powers with the figure of Venizelos in order to make this mixed opposition into a compact body of opinion working in effect if not in inten- tion for Germany. The first act of Venizelos on taking office was to inform Serbia as well as Germany and the protecting Powers that his policy was to preserve Serbia from Bulgarian attack, and his dispatch to the German Government expressed the hope that Germany " would not fail to exercise all her influence in order to restrain Bulgaria from attacking Serbia, and would thus ensure the preservation of peace on the Greek frontiers." Germany and Bulgaria, however, had received information from other quarters to a very different effect. Bulgaria mobilized on Sept. 23, and three days later the Bulgarian premier publicly reassured his followers on the subject of Greek and Rumanian neutrality. Venizelos accordingly ordered a counter-mobilization, and was then reminded at the Palace that, as the King did not want to fight Germany, this must be regarded only as a " precau- tionary measure"; he agreed, and, having received an assurance from Sofia that Bulgaria had no intention of attacking either Greece or Serbia, explained in the Chamber (Sept. 29) that in spite of Bulgaria's declared intention of maintaining an " armed neutrality " the situation was grave, and suggested that it might be easily improved by a simultaneous demobilization. At this time the opposition press began to develop for the first time the suggestion, which proceeded from the general staff, that Serbia was not in a position to carry out her obligation, under the military convention annexed to the Greco-Serbian Treaty, to put 150,000 men into the field for the operations against Bulgaria. And Venizelos, in the course of his discussions with the King, who at this time disputed neither the validity of the Greco-Serbian Treaty nor the authority of his prime minister as head of a constitutionally elected Government, but could only repeat that he did not want to fight Germany, was authorized to meet the arguments of the general staff by asking France and England to supply in place of Serbia the 150,000 bayonets stipulated by the military convention. The King subsequently changed his mind, but the invitation had already been sent. On Oct. 2 a note from the French Minister announced the arrival at Salonika of the first French troops " in order to 1 assist Serbia," France and England assuming " that Greece . . . will not oppose measures taken in the interests of Serbia who is her ally." At this the King pointed out that the troops must not land until Bulgaria attacked Serbia; for the Treaty would not come into force until Bulgaria declared war, and until that moment the landing of foreign troops would be a violation of Greek neutrality; and Venizelos accordingly himself formally protested against the disembarkation, which would, however, it was understood, be facilitated in every possible manner. On Oct. 4 Venizelos explained in the Greek Chamber his intention of respecting the Greco-Serbian Treaty and using the Greek
army to protect the Serbian flank: " Greece has no immediate quarrel with Germany and Austria: but if in the course of events in the Balkan peninsula she should find herself faced by other Powers, she will act as her honour demands. Such is the policy of the present Government. I would add that it has been approved by the Greek nation at the recent elections." In the debate that followed M. Gounares declared for the first time his view that the Treaty with Serbia was only applicable to a purely Balkan war. Venizelos received the confidence of the Chamber by a majority of 46. On the following morning he was dismissed from office by the King, who entrusted the formation of a Government to M. Zaimes.
M. Zaimes announced a policy of "armed neutrality," and in replying on Oct. n to a Serbian appeal for assistance (which England supported with the offer to cede Cyprus, an offer withdrawn on Oct. 22), he developed the argument that the Treaty had a " purely Balkan character," and applied only to a " war between one of the Allied States and a single other Power." He added the remarkable sophism that " even in the course of the European War, Greece was ready to face the Bulgarian danger. . . ." But Greece anticipated a Bulgarian attack undertaken separately even though in conjunction with other hostilities directed against Serbia. The hypothesis of a combined attack with other Powers was outside the question. The Venizelist majority in the Chamber continued to support the new Government, on the understanding that Greek neutral- ity, as announced by M. Zaimes, was not less " benevolent " than before, until Nov. 3 when an incident produced by Gen. Giannakitsas, the Minister for War, provoked Venizelos to defeat the Government by 33 votes. On the following day Gen. Giannakitsas was given an appointment at court. The King dismissed the Chamber (Nov. 6), and a Government was formed by M. Skouloudes, a wealthy old man of good repute but weak character, who elaborated the now usual declaration (Nov. 9) of " very benevolent neutrality " towards the Entente.
The elections for the new Chamber were held on Dec. 19. Venizelos and the Liberal party decided to abstain from the polls, as a protest against what they regarded as an unconstitu- tional use of the King's authority in this second dissolution of the Chamber. The Liberals had the barren satisfaction of noting that only 230,000 votes were polled as against 720,000 recorded in the previous June. M. Skouloudes, now wholly under the influence of the Palace and the general staff, soon found that the practice of " very benevolent neutrality " was less easy than the profession. He was driven to admit that there were only two sorts of neutrality, voluntary and involuntary. In April he refused permission for the use of Greek railways for the transport of the Serbian army overland from Corfu to Salon- ika; and the manner of his refusal gave further offence to France.
On May 23 he received from the German minister a notifica- tion that For,t Rupel, a key position of great importance in the passes entering eastern Macedonia, would shortly be occupied as a " purely defensive " measure and without prejudice to Greek sovereignty. Two days later the fortress and its contents were duly surrendered by the Greek garrison to German and Bulgarian troops. M. Skouloudes possibly argued that if he was to remain neutral he could not refuse to Germany facilities which he had granted to the Allied forces at Salonika. Unfortu- nately he denied all knowledge of the incident when questioned in the Chamber on June 6, and his attitude was the beginning of a period of almost open hostility between the Greek Gov- ernment and the Allies. " By adopting a passive attitude in face of an invasion which might weaken the position of the Allies, Greece appeared to be abandoning her policy of benevo- lent neutrality," telegraphed the Greek charge d'affaires from Paris. The incident led to violent attacks on King Constantine; he was as violently defended by the German propaganda and by his own supporters in Athens; and now, embittered by these attacks, it must be assumed that he began definitely to desire a German victory.
On June 3 Gen. Sarrail proclaimed martial law at Salonika On June 21 the Allied ministers presented a note, drafted a
