nies. Each company was then commanded by a major or captain,
with a captain as second-in-command. Subaltern officers became_
the responsible and effective commanders of the four platoons
into which the new companies were divided, and four of the ser-
geants who originally commanded sections of the old companies
became platoon-sergeants and hence second-in-command. Thus
one notable result of the change was to allot the responsibility
of an executive role to the subaltern in place of the senior non-
commissioned officer. The change rested on sound psychology,
because the latter has generally proved less capable of initiative,
though excellent as an adviser on account of his length of ex-
perience, and admirable as an executor of a definite order. The
eight colour-sergeants of the old companies were allotted to the
four new companies with the titles of company-sergeant-major
and company-quartermaster-sergeant,, the former for tactical,
the latter for administrative duties.
The organization of a battalion at the beginning of the war was as follows: Headquarters, machine-gun section (two guns), four companies. For purposes of administration the personnel of battalion headquarters other than the battalion commander a lieutenant-colonel, the senior major, adjutant and quartermaster and the machine-gun section were unfortunately distributed to companies and platoons as supernumerary to their establish- ments. They should have been kept at battalion headquarters. A company consisted of company headquarters and four pla- toons, numbered from i to 12 throughout the battalion. A platoon was composed of four sections. A section was com- manded by a non-commissioned officer and was the normal fire unit. Four battalions, from various regiments, were grouped to form a brigade. In the British army the regiment is simply a unit of sentiment and the spring from which esprit de corps arises. It is based on a fixed regimental depot which is the common link of battalions scattered over the British Empire. The four- company battalion marked a stepping-stone in the history of the British infantry, because the platoon became the " tactical " unit instead of the company. As a logical consequence the fire unit (section) decreased in size and became the command of a junior N:C.O. a corporal or lance-corporal.
At first this change seemed incomprehensible to the lay mind because it was contrary to the idea that in modern war the improvement of communications tends to centralization and control by the higher authorities. But the extent of the modern battle-field and the increase and improvement of mechanical weapons tend to isolate and break up infantry units more than formerly. A further consequence of the change was that British infantry organization became based on a four-unit system from the brigade down to the platoon. This uniform distribution of units in multiples of four proved to be handier than the French and the German distribution in multiples of three. By the end of 1918 the four-unit system was pronounced to be the best, whether for tactics or administration or reliefs or daily routine but especially for tactical handling in the field. One reason for this is that " odd " numbers destroy the even distribution of duties. In fact the French and German distribution was a three-cornered organization in more senses than one.
The outstanding defect of British pre-war preparations lay in the allotment of only two machine-guns to each battalion and none to a brigade. Another defect which soon became apparent was that the enhanced responsibilities of the company and platoon commanders were not accompanied as they should have been with increased disciplinary powers.
Other Armies, 1914. In the German, French and U.S. armies the regiment consisted of three battalions, and was a tactical as well as an administrative unit. In Germany it was commanded by a colonel with a lieutenant-colonel as his second-in-command. The battalion, commanded by a major, was divided into four companies, each commanded by a captain. The company was divided into three sections (Ziige) each under a subaltern who had as his understudy or second-in-command, either a sergeant- major, a " vice-sergeant-major " or a " sword-knot ensign " (aspirant-officer). On mobilization for war one additional officer was allotted to each company. Prior to mobilization
every infantry regiment and Jager battalion was provided with a machine-gun company of six guns, plus one spare. The French company was organized into four sections, commanded in war by three subalterns and one adjutant (superior company sergeant- major). The sections were grouped in pairs to constitute pdolons (platoons) under the senior of the two section leaders. In peace there were only two subalterns on the establishment for the four sections. Machine-gun sections were allotted to battalions as in the British army. In the United States the company was com- posed of three officers and 150 rifles, divided into two sections, each of three squads. In the World War, however, the U.S. infantry regiment was modelled on the continental form, having also a regimental machine-gun company, a headquarters company and a supply company.
Thus before the World War the infantry battalion was in almost every country about 1,000 rifles strong, allotted to four companies each commanded by a mounted officer. But the British battalion was the weakest in fighting strength, because its First Line Transport and other services were deducted from its 1,000 rifles, whereas the regimental systems of continental infantry provided these services from a separate regimental establishment. The subalterns were dismounted officers, whose commands varied as follows: British 50 men, German 80 men, French 50 men, United States 75 men. But in the British infan- try a large proportion of the 50 men borne on the strength of every platoon were absent on other duties. For instance, they were signallers, or machine-gunners, or bandsmen, or transport drivers, or pioneers -they were in fact everything except fighting infantrymen and these should have been struck off the rolls of the fighting platoons. The British Treasury, however, ordained otherwise, and thus made training and fighting difficult and sometimes impossible for the platoon commander.
Changes during 1914-8. During the war the basic organization of the infantry of the belligerent powers was not materially altered. The changes were chiefly in the direction of additional weapons and a multiplication of kit, which reduced the infantry soldier to a beast of burden laden under a weight which destroyed his mobility. In 1915 the British infantry as compared with the German suffered from a paucity of heavy machine-guns, and was slow to increase its machine-gun strength. At first an increase was made (up to four per battalion), and when manufacturers increased their output these were formed into machine-gun com- panies. They were gradually divorced from the infantry and formed into a machine-gun corps, firstly as brigade machine-gun companies and finally as divisional battalions. By the time this had been accomplished, the lighter Lewis gun had made its appearance, and had been allotted definitely to infantry units. The first issue (not long before the battle of Loos, 1915) was only two or four guns per battalion, but by the end of Nov. 1915, when brigade machine-gun companies had been formed, the establishment of Lewis guns was beginning to increase. The tendency at first was to use this weapon like a heavy machine-gun and consequently as a battalion weapon, but when its characteris- tics were better understood it took its rightful place, first .as a company weapon in 1916 and finally as a platoon weapon in Feb. 1917. Battalions were issued with 16 guns, i.e. one per platoon, but were so satisfied with this weapon that demands were submitted for a further supply. By March i 1918 16 more guns for platoons and 4 for anti-aircraft work became available, making a total of 36 per battalion. We then find the platoon composed of four sections, two of which were armed with one Lewis gun each. The allotment of an automatic weapon on such a scale marked an important step in the tactics of infantry. One of these new weapons, handled by only two men, could deliver a stream of bullets equal in number to, and more accurately aimed than, what could formerly be projected by 25 soldiers with rifles. Obviously the number of men required in the forefront of the battle could now be reduced without affecting the volume of fire. This meant fewer casualties and bigger reserves for the arm without which battles cannot be won. Consequently, the maxi- mum number of soldiers in every section was reduced to one leader and six men, making a total for all ranks of a platoon
