only 31 actually taken into action. The change was dictated by the shortage of man-power, which threatened to deplete the ranks of the infantry. Any numbers over the 31 were to be left out of every battle as reinforcements, but few platoons ever numbered more than 20 men actually available after 1916.
The Germans were faced with the man-power problem before any of the other belligerents, and they also appreciated the value of the light machine-gun. In March 1917 they issued three to every company, and afterwards raised this allotment to six by giving two guns to each platoon. Finally, each German battalion consisted of a heavy machine-gun company of 1 2 guns, and three infantry companies armed with six light machine-guns each, without counting the special machine-gun companies allotted to divisions in every battle. This tremendous increase of automatic weapons had an inevitable effect on infantry formations. The costly attacks on narrow frontages were abandoned. The suc- cessive lines or waves of men gave place to open formations. The four sections of a platoon were gradually separated from one another and compelled to manoeuvre and fight under their own leaders. When platoons were too weak to man four sections, they fought with only two, one of which was armed with a Lewis gun. The frontages allotted to attacking platoons were increased, and in some of the great battles of 1918 we find platoons attacking on frontages of 200 and even 300 yd. with very small effectives. Fire-power was at last understood.
In addition to the Lewis gun, rifle grenade, and hand grenade, the Stokes light mortar proved to be a most useful infantry wea- pon. Although it did not form an integral part of battalions, the brigade light-mortar batteries drew their personnel entirely from the infantry, and the mortars were allotted to battalions during operations. The light mortar was the nearest approach to an infantry gun in the British army, and though not an ideal weapon, rendered great help to battalions in reducing enemy machine- guns and strong points. The German mortars in the summer of 1918 were distributed as follows. Each regiment had a regimental " minenwerfer " company, organized in three sections, each with three light minenwerfer and in addition two or three medium minenwerfer. The important part played by these weapons in battle tended to prove that infantry, when scientifically armed, can become independent of other arms, and is capable of fighting its own local battle either with or without artillery support and tanks. To fulfil this role, however, it needs to be more highly and scientifically trained than before the World War. The importance of training the commanders of companies, platoons, and sections cannot be over-emphasized, and it was the shortage of these trained officers and non-commissioned officers which caused so much deterioration after the battle of Ypres in 1917.
Organization in 1919. On Nov. n 1918, the date of the Armistice, the British infantry battalion was organized in bat- talion headquarters and four companies, each company consist- ing of company headquarters and four platoons. Each platoon consisted of headquarters and four sections, two of which were armed with one Lewis gun each. Certain riflemen in the sections carried rifle and hand grenades. The platoon was the largest unit composed of men whose sole duty is to fight, and the war established it as the " tactical unit " of infantry. The section is, however, the fire unit upon which infantry organization is built. It consists of a leader and six men, a number which experience has proved the largest that can be directly controlled in action by one commander. It is therefore the " fire-unit " of the infantry. Thus the British subaltern officer's command in battle became 28 fighting men as compared with 50 in 1914 but it should be remembered that the two Lewis guns and the rifle grenade and hand grenade increased the fire-power of the platoon out of all proportion to the number of its men.
Meanwhile the German organization had undergone no funda- mental change, though its battalions had decreased considerably in size. Previous to the offensive of March 21 1918, the German High Command had fixed the total establishment of an infantry battalion at 980 men including the machine-gun company. This establishment was reduced on July i 1918 to 880 men (750 men for the four companies and 130 men for the machine-gun com-
pany). In the autumn of 1918 the strength of a normal German infantry battalion was estimated at 20 officers and 650 other ranks, including the machine-gun company, but, as a matter of fact, many German battalions mustered less than 300 men all told at the end of the war. Each battalion consisted of four com- panies and a machine-gun company. Companies were numbered i to 12 throughout the regiment; machine-gun companies were numbered i, 2 and 3. A company was organized in three platoons, numbered i, 2, 3 in each company. Each* platoon (Zug) was divided into four sections commanded by corporals ( Unterojfizier) , numbered i to 12 throughout the company. The smallest subdivision was the section (Gruppe) under a lance-corporal, but many of the subdivisions became nominal under defeat in 1918.
Post-war Organization. The basic structure of the post-war British' battalion has remained that of the battab'on of 1918, viz.: an organization of companies, platoons and sections on the four- unit system which has successfully passed the test of war and should remain unaltered, though administration is likely to be simplified. The peace strength will probably be 28 officers and 700 other ranks at home, the war strength over 1,000. The chief innovation will be the introduction of a fifth subdivision of the battalion, viz.: the headquarters wing. The interior organization of the four companies will be as in 1918 except that a separate company headquarters will contain both some fighting and the administrative portions of the company, namely, men who do not belong to or fight in platoons (e.g. company sergeant-major and company quartermaster-sergeant, company signallers and cooks). These will be borne on the strength of company head- quarters and will free the platoons of the incubus of mere paper men. It is around the headquarters wing that the chief in- terest lies. This unit is the outcome of experience, for during the World War almost every experienced battalion commander formed a unit which was commonly called a headquarters company. It was unauthorized officially, but proved itself to be indispensable. This so-called headquarters company con- tained the personnel of the battalion necessary for fighting and administrative efficiency that is to say, all who do not actually take part in an action as members of companies. For example, battalion signallers, police, pioneers, cooks and grooms cannot be classified as men whose duty is solely fighting. The inclusion of these specialists, or " employed men " as they were called, on the strength of platoons gave the higher authorities an erroneous impression of what the actual fighting strength of a battalion was. For example, a platoon might contain 18 fighting men under the old conditions and in addition 12 " employed men." Its total strength was therefore 30 men on paper, but it only took 18 into battle and merely encumbered its pay -books with the 12 men who were otherwise employed. The headquarters wing, so called to distinguish it from a fighting company, will be approximately 200 strong, subdivided into four groups for administration. In particular, it is of interest to note that in the headquarters wing will be included, as an integral part of the battalion, the machine-gun platoon (eight heavy machine-guns) and the Stokes light-mortar section (probably two, possibly four mortars). Although these are composed of men whose duty is fighting, it would be incorrect to include them in the platoons, as they neither fight as part of them nor are trained by the platoon commander. It will be observed that the battalion in 1921 was armed with seven different kinds of weapons (not to mention smoke and gas) as compared with two in 1914: viz. the rifle and bayonet, the rifle grenade, the hand grenade, the Lewis gun, the Vickers gun, the light mortar, the revolver for Lewis gunners. In addition it is likely that it will be necessary also to arm infan- try battalions with some form of light gun, primarily for defence against tanks. The question of accompanying artillery is dealt with elsewhere (see ARTILLERY). There will then be self-contained battalions which must be skilfully trained in the use of the numer- ous weapons with which they will be armed. The crux of the infantry problem will be how to train the infantry soldier, equipped as he will be with these complex weapons.
The need for skilled officers and trained non-commissioned
