and, this flank being always unsupported at one extremity, in German efforts to seize this extremity from two directions. These attempts, on either side, taking place farther and farther from Compiegne, appeared as a "Race to the Sea"; but in reality neither side was deliberately making for the coast. The S.-N. direction taken by the line of contact was not sought by either opponent; it resulted from the balance of forces.
It is evident that, whatever resources on either side were fur- nished by reserves and new formations, the extension of the front of contact over a length of 200 km. was only possible on condition of leaving much thinner forces on the stabilized front than had been required for the battle of movement, from Aug. 20 to Sept. 12. In proportion as the lines extended to the N., transferences took place, depleting the line from Belfort to Compiegne, as had already been done in the Vosges and in Lorraine, to enforce the regions where the struggle was being carried on in open country.
As regards such transferences, the advantage was with the Germans, because they occupied the interior of the angle whose apex points to Compiegne, while the Allied troops had to be moved around this point.
On the German side, the manoeuvre brought 18 new army corps into the line. On the Allied side it resulted in the transference of the II. Army (de Castelnau) between the Oise and the Somme; the formation of the X. Army (Maud'huy), N. of the Somme, and the VIII. Army (d'Urbal), which included the Belgian army, brought back from Antwerp; and lastly in the shifting of the British army into Flanders. To these transfers and new crea- tions must be added various formations constituted on the spot, of which the most important was a group of territorial divisions placed under the orders of General Brugere. Some of these for- mations had already joined in the offensive after the battle of the Marne, notably at Amiens, which they had cleared of the German units scattered through Picardy and Artois. This ensemble was placed under the command of General Foch, but was only brought to completion by degrees. The successive steps will now be described. '
The first offensive action against the German right began on Sept. n, in accordance with the order given by General Joffre. It was carried out by the VI. Army, with one additional corps on the right bank of the Oise. It immediately encountered ener- getic resistance on the Aronde, a small tributary prolonging the depression of the Aisne valley on the opposite side of the Oise. On the northern bank of this stream wooded heights extend be- tween Compiegne, Lassigny and Noyon, and surround Ribe- court names which all became famous during the war.
The VI. Army had a difficult task in the subduing of them, and could hardly have achieved it, threatened as it was with an at- tack in flank, without the help of the II. Army (de Castelnau), which, detraining in the Clermont-Beauvais area, had to cover 30 or 40 km. in order to outflank the German right. At the same time the cavalry and the territorial divisions of General Brugere extended the movement towards the north.
The resulting battles were prolonged until the end of Sept. with alternations of success and reverse, through Lassigny, Roye, and Chaulnes, as far as Peronne. From Peronne to Lassigny, where the wooded hills ceased, the terrain consisted of undulating plains, where no line of battle could be found. It was thus the balance of forces that determined the front of contact, which was gradually fortified on either side.
On Sept. 24 the French retook Peronne and lost it again. This little place, in a hollow, offering no possibility of outlook or of action outside its walls, had no military value. The positions which should have been occupied in the circumstances were the heights of the Somme above Peronne which formed a very con- siderable obstacle. The great value of this line, especially facing eastward, owing to the command of the country in that direction given by the heights, did not escape the German staff, and for a long time their efforts were directed towards preventing the Allies from securing the heights, by the defence of improvised fortifications, at some distance in front of them. Later it will be seen how these lines were linked up with that of the Ancre.
It will now be shown how, after the preliminary fighting, the German front became established between the Aisne and the Oise. A salient is always a weakness. The front was fixed from E. to W. along the Aisne; and the flank resolving itself into a new front running N. and S. the German line exhibited a right-angle salient pointing towards the forest of Laigne. It was very largely to smooth out this salient that the line was traced behind the forest in such a way as to form a great arc instead of a point. South of the portion of the line of the Somme between Peronne and Ham it was necessary to connect this arc with the fortified line S. of Peronne; the line Chaulnes-Roye-Lassigny was thus strongly indicated as the connecting line.
On Sept. 23 there was fighting near Lassigny, on Sept. 25 near Roye, and on Sept. 29 in the same places and also at Chaulnes, where the Allies were repulsed, as they were at the salient itself. On Oct. i the fighting-line extended to near Arras. It will be seen how it came to be fixed on the N. of Peronne.
The old fortress of Arras, which was no longer more than half fortified, but whose citadel had been maintained in good condition, was a point d'appui for the Allies. The interval, 40 km. wide, between Arras and the Somme, provided some fea- tures which were favourable to the establishment of a line. First, near Arras, there was the little valley of the Crinchon. The stream itself is unimportant, but its banks afford positions which are good in default of better ones. Next, a connecting line had to be ensured over about 15 km., from N. to S., across the undulating plateau, to the course of the Ancre, which forms a deep ravine both above and below Albert. The river bends in a S.W. direction as far as Corbie on the Somme.
Thus the line traced by the depression favourable to a line of resistance forms a series of zigzags: the Ancre near Albert, the Somme from Corbie to Peronne, the Somme from Peronne to Ham; It was because of this peculiarity that the Germans, when they were defending the line of the Ancre, opposite Albert, could not make use of the section of the Somme between Peronne and Ham, because it was 20 km. to the rear. Their solution con- sisted therefore of drawing a line through the Corbie salient, behind which lay Combles, transformed into a magazine and supply depot. This brought them in front of the section of the Somme between Peronne and Ham.
During the " Race to the Sea" the fighting round Albert and Arras (see ARTOIS, BATTLES IN) began at the end of Sept. and on Oct. I respectively. The X. French Army then came into the line. The Germans were already strongly entrenched on the Thicpval plateau, opposite Albert, where they were to pile up the defensive works which the British were to capture, one by one, two years later.
On Oct. 2-3 the X. Army (Maud'huy) made an effort to seize the German flank at its northern extremity by moving forward to Douai, where there had been for some time a detachment of the territorial army, which did not succeed in maintaining its hold. But the Germans opposed with heavy forces of infantry and cavalry. The French were pressed back; the enemy occupied Lens and made a vigorous but unsuccessful attack on Arras. For a long time after- wards the Allies' line left Lens in possession of the Germans, lying farther westward on a line from Arras towards B6thune. Arras was included indeed, but the important positions of Vimy and Notre Dame de Lorette, of which the Germans would not lose hold, were cut off. Their importance consisted in their facing N.E. and later their capture necessitated long and painful effort.
The German cavalry was in all the country which lay beyond in the N. ; it occupied Ypres and Bailleul, and sent out patrols still farther forward. The situation was very difficult for the Allies, and its improvement was an urgent matter. The VIII. Army (d'Urbal) had its base at Dunkirk, but it was still inadequately constituted. The French cavalry and General Brugere's territorial divisions were maintaining an arduous and very fatiguing struggle. At that mo- ment the British army, which could now be withdrawn from the Aisne, as that front was strong and solid and could be held by a small force, was summoned N. Reinforcements were also brought from the eastern area, and lastly the Belgian army, no longer of any use in Antwerp, came to take its place in the ensemble. The story of the siege of Antwerp and of the escape of the Belgian field army from the place is told under ANTWERP.
At the time of the fall of Antwerp Sir John French and General Joffre met at Doullens, on Oct. 8. The British II. Corps arrived on Oct. 12 near Bethune and Aire, and was able to attack the enemy's flank in a combined operation with the X. French Army. The III. Corps detrained at St. Omer on Oct. 12 ; the I. followed. Finally the IV. Corps, supporting the Belgian army in its retreat, would rejoin the rest.
