tated between the policy of working for a separate peace with the Habsburg dynasty, leaving its territory almost untouched, and the alternative of trying to support and encourage all the anti-German and pro-Ally elements in the Austria-Hungarian Empire. The objective selected by Crewe House was to support the national desires of the Czechs, Southern Slavs, Rumanes, Poles and Italians for independence, so as to form a strong non-German chain of Central European and Danubian States, and thus to encourage the disinclination of these peoples to fight for their German masters.
The chief obstacle to the policy of the British propaganda was the pledge given to Italy in 1915, to give her certain Austrian territories inhabited by Southern Slavs. In 1917, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had assembled in Corfu, and under the leadership of Dr. Trumbitch, president of the Southern Slav Committee, and M. Pashitch, prime minister of Serbia, had proclaimed the unity of the three Southern Slav peoples. Early in 1918, after recovery from the disaster of Caporetto had begun, the united Southern Slavs, on the initiation of Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton Watson, came into conference with leading Italians and agreed to settle amicably the territorial controversies in dispute. Lord Northcliffe took up the position at that point, and almost the first step of his campaign was to send Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton Watson to the Congress of Oppressed Habsburg Nationalities which took place at Rome with the consent of the Italian Government. Meantime he urged on the War Cabinet the need of coming to a decision between the alternative policies and of obtaining the agreement of the French, Italians and Americans to the choice. He got only a dubious and halting opinion from the British Foreign Secretary, who urged that the same propaganda could be adapted at least to the earlier stages of either polity. This indecision, maintained through the war and through the peace negotiations, led to the disastrous adventure of D'Annunzio, for the Italians, like other peoples, flushed with the unexpected joy of complete victory, forgot the wise concessions to which they had been willing when the issue was doubtful. But Lord Northcliffe's mission achieved a temporary and successful unity of purpose. A joint commission consisting of representatives of Italy, Great Britain and France, was established at the Italian general headquarters, with the special object of conducting propaganda directed to the oppressed nationalities in the Austrian armies. Representatives of committees of each of the oppressed nationalities were attached to the commission. A polyglot printing press was acquired, and large quantities of propaganda of all kinds were distributed by aeroplane, rockets, grenades and contact patrols. The latter consisted of deserters of Czechoslovak, Southern Slav, Polish and Rumanian nationalities, who volunteered for this service against their former oppressors. The effect was soon apparent. Deserters belonging to the subject races came over to the Italian armies in large numbers, so that the attack planned by the Austrians had to be postponed. Unfortunately, the complete success of the effort, apparently assured early in May, was prevented by the reactionary tendencies within the Italian Government, supported by the uncertain attitude of the Governments of France, Great Britain and the United States. But even in the face of this difficulty, the success was so great that, after the battle of the Piave, members of the Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission were received and thanked by the Italian commander-in-chief.
While this great campaign was taking place on the Italian front, the propaganda addressed to Germany was being intensified. On assuming office, Lord Northcliffe found the War Office propaganda department, described above, in full operation. Except that he at once began to press the Government to renew the original permission for the use of aeroplanes, he suggested no change in the War Office work. His committee at Crewe House, however, first with the assistance of Mr. H. G. Wells and after a few weeks with that of Mr. H. Hamilton Fyfe, set to work to frame a general propaganda policy directed against Germany, and to produce leaflets and other matter. Some of this material was given to the War Office Department; much of it was distributed by special means chiefly through neutral countries. In July, when the work in Italy had been established on permanent lines, and Mr. Steed had returned to London, it was decided to concentrate all the production of propaganda at Crewe House, with the object of bringing it more into line with a concerted policy. Accordingly, the writer of this article was transferred from the War Office to Crewe House, but kept in touch with the War Office as liaison officer, the army remaining the agent for distribution.
The General Committee met daily at Crewe House, receiving the reports of the different branches, collecting information from all possible sources, and stimulating the propagandist work against Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Germany. It became more and more obvious during the summer of 1918 that the spirit of the enemy was breaking on every front, that they were alert to every suggestion as to the approach of peace, and that the supreme necessity was a clear statement of the intentions of the Allies. Lord Northcliffe, with varying success, continued to press the Government for such a definition of policy as would serve as a true basis for propaganda. The fundamental principle on which he wished to act was that when a line of policy had been sanctioned as a basis for propaganda, the Allied Governments should be asked for their assent to it, so that their propaganda departments might act in concert. Failing to obtain a clear lead from the British Government, who at that time appeared to have no definite policy with regard to any issue of the war, Lord Northcliffe convened an inter-Allied propaganda conference at Crewe House. It was attended by Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Information, representatives of the British Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty and Air Ministry, and by delegates from France, Italy and the United States, the U.S.A. delegation, however, being instructed to attend only as observers. The conference, after a plenary session, divided into committees to discuss details of policy, methods of publicity and methods of distribution. At a final plenary session the reports of the committees were adopted, and it was agreed that they should be submitted by the heads of the four missions to their respective Governments for approval. The conference then constituted a permanent Inter-Allied Body for the conduct of propaganda in enemy countries. Steps were at once taken to secure the permanency of contact between the propagandist agencies which had been established at the conference, and these became increasingly effective until, when the Armistice came, there was almost complete unity of action amongst the Allies.
As the possibility of peace drew nearer, it became still more urgent that propaganda should be kept free from any trace of confusion. To secure this, a Central Body, called the Policy Committee of the British War Mission, was formed at Crewe House; it consisted of representatives of Lord Northcliffe's department and of the War Cabinet, the Admiralty, War Office, Foreign Office, Treasury, Ministry of Information, Air Ministry, Colonial Office, India Office, War Aims Committee and Official Press Bureau. It decided to undertake the following activities:—Study of peace terms, study of utterances by important enemy representatives, their real significance and the nature of the response to be made to them. It had to take action almost at once, since the German Peace Note, with its reference to the publication of President Wilson's “fourteen points,” required immediate attention from British propagandists. Lord Northcliffe's committee had been studying the fourteen points with a very close attention. It was plain that they could not be understood as a full recitation of the conditions of peace, and that it was therefore a matter of honesty and of prudence to define the interpretation put on them by Great Britain before accepting the surrender of Germany. This view was accepted by the Policy Committee, and, after detailed discussion, a statement drafted by the Crewe House Committee was adopted in principle. It was approved, by a representative of the Government designated for the purpose, for unofficial use as propaganda policy. Each department henceforward made it the text of its productions. As this document is of historical interest, it is here printed in full.
