Treaty of San Stefano, dreamed of " the four seas" (the Adri- atic as well as the Black, Aegean and Marmora). The four Governments seemed each bent upon annexing a maximum of territory, and thus too often became the tools of Powers whose ambitious plans of political and military equilibrium they had unconsciously upset. Above all, the long delays in restoring peace stabilized the various regimes of occupation and proved fatal to mutual understanding. Between Bulgaria and Greece there was no territorial bargain, and no obvious means of reaching one, while Serbia as early as Jan. 23 formally raised the question of a revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. This rested on the argument that Serbia was entitled to compensation for four reasons (i) that she had furnished her ally with military support far in excess of her bargain, (2) that she had absolved Bulgaria from her military obligations in Macedonia, (3) that she had loyally continued the war three months after her own work was done, and (4) that the acquisition of Adrianople by Bulgaria radically modified the basis upon which the bargain rested. But if Serbia's attitude is to be justified, it must be on the broader ground that events had transformed the situation still further to her disadvantage in another direction. Her two parallel aims in the war had been the political liberation of her kinsmen under Turkish rule, and her own economic emancipa- tion by means of free access to the sea; and from the practical rather than the sentimental standpoint the second was much the more vital. Her whole calculation centred upon securing the Sanjak, Kosovo and a link with Montenegro, and a port in northern Albania (as the best substitute for access through Herzegovina); and when Austria-Hungary imposed her veto upon the latter, the Vardar valley became Serbia's only possible alternative outlet, and this involved her retention of Veles, Prilep, Monastir and Okhrida as well as the " disputed zone." That Vienna deliberately aimed at thus embroiling Serbia and Bulgaria is shown by the fact that during the earlier Albanian negotiations Count Berchtold had offered to Serbia the whob of the Vardar valley with Salonika itself, if she would renounce her Adriatic claims. Bulgaria, on her side, insisted on the literal interpretation of the treaty and showed herself indifferent to Serbia's difficulties on the west.
Meanwhile Russia had made every effort to avert a conflict, Sazonov going so far as to express regret at the Serbo-Greek negotiations (April 17), while warning Bulgaria of possible danger from Rumania, in the event of aggression against Serbia (April 28). On April 30 the Russian ministers in Sofia and Belgrade simultaneously reminded the wo allies of their obli- gation to submit disputes to Russian arbitration. But Sazonov's success in settling a Bulgaro-Rumanian frontier dispute had only served to render Sofia more unyielding, and on May 19 the Bulgarian commander-in-chief wrote to the premier, assuming war with Serbia and Greece to be inevitable, and urging con- centration against the former. The pressure very rightly brought to bear by Sir E. Grey upon the peace delegates in favour of the Treaty of London was misinterpreted by the Bulgarians (who alone had any motive for haste) as a guarantee of that Treaty against Turkey, and as dispensing them from the need of guarding their eastern frontier. They were still further encouraged by the openly Serbophobe tone of the official press in Vienna and Budapest: and King Ferdinand had already ordered Gen. Savov to hasten the transference of the army from the Thracian to the Macedonian front, when on May 27 Pasic, under pressure from the Serbian opposition, publicly committed his Government to the demand for treaty revision. This hastened the resignation of the pacific Gesov, behind whose back King Ferdinand was already concerting aggressive action. Before he went, Gesov, under strong Russian pressure, met Pasic at Tsaribrod (June i) and agreed to Russia's proposal for a meeting of Balkan premiers at St. Petersburg; but a further proposal for the immediate reduction of the allied armies to a third, though accepted by Serbia and Greece, failed owing to the impossible conditions put forward by Gen. Savov. Gesov's successor, Dr. Danev, opposed the meeting of the premiers, contended that Russia had already prejudged the case by even
considering revision, and relied increasingly upon Austria- Hungary. That his confidence was not ungrounded is shown by Count Berchtold's assurance to Rumania in May that the Dual Monarchy was ready to defend Bulgaria " even by force of arms." l Serbia and Greece on their part were fully alive to the danger; there had been informal talks between Venizelos and Novakovic in London, and between Prince Alexander of Serbia and Prince Nicholas of Greece in January and March at Salonika. After the accession of King Constantino, a less conciliatory mood prevailed in Athens and Belgrade, each of whom in turn made secret overtures to Rumania for a defensive alliance, but with- out success (April 19, June 8). Their own agreement was hastened by the common danger, and the Serbo-Greek military convention of May 14 was revised on June i and supplemented by a definite treaty of alliance for 10 years. While the first of these provided for mutual military support in case of a Bul- garian attack upon either ally, the second extended the casus foederis to an attack by a third Power, " in circumstances en- visaged by the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia." Both the wording and the events of the moment make it clear that the intention was to guard against an Austro-Hungarian attack upon Serbia; in 1913 King Constantino took this risk, but in 1915 he was to deny its application.
On June 8 the Russian Government made its supreme effort for peace, by inducing the Tsar to address a personal appeal to the kings of Serbia and Bulgaria, which closed with the warning that " the first to make war would be responsible before the Slav cause." King Peter's courteous though somewhat ambig- uous answer was never published; but that of King Ferdinand, which threw the entire blame upon Serbia and argued that the Bulgarian claim had long been admitted by Russia, was a fresh blow to the cause of peace. On June 13 the Powers made a joint demarche at Sofia and Belgrade in favour of demobilization, but Bulgaria imposed the impossible condition of a preliminary joint occupation of the disputed territory. Her attitude stiffened still further after the speech of the new Hungarian premier, Count Tisza, who emphasized the right of the Balkan States to settle differences in their own way even by war and de- clared that Austria-Hungary could not allow any other Power to acquire special prerogatives in the peninsula (June 19). As a natural result, Russia's fresh proposals for a conference of Balkan premiers in St. Petersburg, while promptly accepted by Belgrade and Athens, were met by Dr. Danev with a reiterated demand for joint occupation, and a virtual ultimatum giving Russia a week in which to pronounce as arbiter and 48 hours to announce compliance with the request. With Sazonov's sharp reply bidding Bulgaria to expect nothing more from Russia, St. Petersburg's influence over Sofia may be said to have ended. Count Tarnowski, the Austro-Hungarian minister in Sofia, was supreme in the counsels of King Ferdinand during the critical fortnight that followed. The deadlock was complete, when on June 22 the Serbian Cabinet was driven to resign, owing to the resentment of the military party at its alleged moderation. The most it could do was to place itself unreservedly in Russia's hands, and when this was endorsed by the Skupstina after a stormy secret session Pasic resumed office (June 26). But Russia was by this time powerless to avert the catastrophe.
The Second Balkan War. On the night of June 29, without previous declaration of war, the Bulgarian armies made an almost simultaneous attack upon the Serbs and Greeks. Their extended order and lack of proper reserves showed how greatly they had underestimated their enemy, and Gen. Savov is credibly reported to have declared that he could cut through the Serbs like " a knife through rotten cheese." But the Serbian generalissimo, Gen. Putnik, was fully alive to the Bulgarian preparations, and in confidential orders to his com- manding officers had warned them that the Bulgars would " use their amicable relations with us " for a surprise attack. In point of fact, on certain sectors those who carried out this " stab in the back " had been dining only a few hours earlier
1 Prince Fiirstenberg to Take Jonescu, who published the facts in La Roumanie, Dec. 15 1914.
