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Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States


  1.   See Jackson Testimony, supra note 3, at 1; Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 3 (June 25, 2021) (written testimony of Rosalind Dixon, University of New South Wales), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Dixon-Letter-SC-commission-June-25-final.pdf (“[T]he Justices continue to enjoy lifetime appointment, without being subject to any form of term limit or mandatory retirement age, in ways that are increasingly unusual in global terms.”).
  2.   Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 3 (July 20, 2021) (written testimony of Tom Ginsburg, University of Chicago Law School), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Ginsburg-Testimony.pdf.
  3.   Id. at 2.
  4.   U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. This formula does not mean that judges, once in office, are entirely immune from consequences or professional incentives. Judges may, of course, be impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors, lower court judges may be elevated to higher courts, and Associate Justices may be appointed Chief Justice.
  5.   McConnell Testimony, supra note 3, at 7.
  6.   See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 769, 778–79 (2006). Nevertheless, Supreme Court vacancies have always occurred irregularly. See Allison Rabkin Golden, David Herman, Alexander Nocks, Ayoub Ouederni & Kaveri Sharma, Vacancies and Tenures on the Supreme Court: A Response to Calabresi and Lindgren (2021) (on file with the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States).
  7.   Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1313, 1316–20 (2007).
  8.   Supreme Court Practitioners’ Committee Testimony, supra note 1, at 78–82; Justices 1789 to Present, Sup. Ct. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx.
  9.   David Ingold, Eighty Is the New 70 as Supreme Court Justices Serve Longer and Longer, Bloomberg (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-supreme-court-justice-tenure (“In 1900, justices tended to be in their late 50s when they joined the court. Today, the average age is about five years younger, and President Donald Trump’s nomination of Gorsuch, currently 49 years old, only furthers that trend.”); see also Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 5 (June 30, 2021) (written testimony of Maya Sen, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Sen-Written-Testimony.pdf.
  10.   Both the median and modal number of appointments are 2, and the mean is 1.83. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 16.
  11.   There have been only six if we include the Reconstruction period, in which Republicans, following Abraham Lincoln’s assassination, refused to allow any appointments by his successor, Andrew Johnson.
  12.   See generally Terri L. Peretti, Promoting Equity in the Distribution of Supreme Court Appointments, in Reforming the Court: Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices 435 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006).
  13.   Cf. Jason P. Davis & Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Rotating Leadership and Collaborative Innovation: Recombination Processes in Symbiotic Relationships, 56 Admin. Sci. Q. 159, 194 (2011) (linking rotating personnel and innovation in decisionmaking); Amir Erez, Jeffrey A. Lepine & Heather Elms, Effects of Rotated Leadership and Peer Evaluation on the Functioning and Effectiveness of Self-Managed Teams: A Quasi-Experiment, 55 Personnel Psych. 929, 929 (2002) (“[T]eams that rotated leadership among members had higher levels of voice, cooperation, and performance.”).
  14.   David Rock & Heidi Grant, Why Diverse Teams Are Smarter, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Nov. 4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/why-diverse-teams-are-smarter; Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity, Compliance, Ethics & In-House Counsel, 48 U. Tol. L. Rev. 465, 483 (2017).
  15.   Darren Rosenblum & Yaron Nili, Board Diversity by Term Limits?, 71 Ala. L. Rev. 211, 242–44 (2019) (describing various businesses that have implemented term limits for members of their boards of directors, and the accompanying decline in the median age of members serving on these boards).

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