Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States
- ↑ In Japan, for instance, judges are appointed by the Cabinet from lists of candidates nominated by the Supreme Court and serve for a term of ten years. Courts in Japan, Sup. Ct. Japan (2020), https://www.courts.go.jp/english/vc-files/courts-en/file/2020_Courts_in_Japan.pdf.
- ↑ See Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States (July 16, 2021) (written testimony of Margaret H. Marshall, Choate Hall & Stewart LLP), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Marshall-Testimony.pdf.
- ↑ In addition to providing that the Justices shall hold their office for “good Behaviour,” Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that they shall, “at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. Cf. infra notes 63–83 and accompanying text.
- ↑ Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 437–38.
- ↑ See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1548; Arthur D. Hellman, Reining in the Supreme Court: Are Term Limits the Answer?, in Reforming the Court: Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices 291, 298–303 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006).
- ↑ See Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 12 (Oct. 2021) (written testimony of Philip Bobbitt, Columbia Law School), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Professor-Philip-Bobbitt.pdf; Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 5 (Aug. 2, 2021) (written testimony of Michael Stokes Paulsen, University of St. Thomas School of Law), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/PCSCOTUS-2021-0001-2159; Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 18 (July 20, 2021) (written testimony of Randy E. Barnett, Georgetown University Law Center), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Barnett-Testimony.pdf.
- ↑ Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 411.
- ↑ Empirical studies modeling the effects of term limits on doctrinal change suggest different possibilities. See Adam Chilton, Daniel Epps, Kyle Rozema & Maya Sen, Designing Supreme Court Term Limits, 95 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 40–42) (on file with the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States) (finding that all but one of the most prominent proposals for term limits would likely have produced fewer flips than actually occurred in the real world); Christopher Sundby & Suzanna Sherry, Term Limits and Turmoil: Roe v. Wade’s Whiplash, 98 Tex. L. Rev. 121, 160 (2019) (concluding that “the danger of increased instability due to term limits is very real” and needs to be weighed against the potential benefits of term limits); cf. Stefanie A. Lindquist, Judicial Activism in State Supreme Courts: Institutional Design and Judicial Behavior, 28 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 61, 102 fig. 6 (2017) (indicating that the state supreme courts with either life tenure or tenure until age 70 overrule fewer precedents than state supreme courts with most other judicial retention methods).
- ↑ Cf. Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 416 (“A two-term president may reflect a single national mood, and there may be value in a Court that cannot be remade by one such gust.”).
- ↑ According to a committee of distinguished Supreme Court practitioners, however, “orchestrating timing within two-year windows would still often prove difficult,” and “[t]he fact that more Justices would have shorter track records” could also impede predictions. Supreme Court Practitioners’ Committee Testimony, supra note 1, at 86.
- ↑ See Hellman, supra note 28, at 303–08.
- ↑ The Federalist No. 78, at 393 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
- ↑ Id. at 392–93.
- ↑ Supreme Court Practitioners’ Committee Testimony, supra note 1, at 78–82; Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 16.
- ↑ See Lee Epstein, Jack C. Knight & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 7, 36 (2001) (“Our analysis of non-renewable terms—an institution used quite frequently in the European context—suggests … it may be more effective [than life tenure] at encouraging sincere behavior on the part of justices.”); Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Free to Judge? How Campaign Finance Money Biases Judges (Stanford Univ. Press, forthcoming 2023) (discussing the experience of state courts with respect to term limits and mandatory retirement ages).
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