Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 9.djvu/795

more reason to fear the consequences of hostility between capital .and labour than England has. For nearly five cen turies the legislature of this country strove to regulate the rate of wages in the interest of employers. To the number less and severe statutes of labourers, which began with 1350 and were continued in full force up to 1825, when they were relaxed rather than repealed, we owe the English poor law in the first place and the trade union in the second. It was natural, when the English Government had been attempting for so long a time to keep down wages by law, and looked with so much hostility on any organization among tho working classes which seemed likely to better their lot, that when the severity of these laws was relaxed the labourers should eagerly adopt the machinery from the use of which they had been so long debarred. But deplor able as has been tho combat between labour and capital, nnd blameworthy as many acts have been on both sides, no one who has given any attention to the subject can fail of noticing that the aims of the trade unions are simple and intelligible, that the representatives of these combina tions court debate, criticism, and sympathy from the public to which they appeal, and that the struggle is carried on with increasing mildness and forbearance. The English unions do not aim at reconstructing society, nor demand subventions from tho state as a means by which they may resist the power of the capitalist, nor adopt those projects which give from, time to time such trouble to Continental Governments. The fact is, the English parliament has withdrawn all artificial aids from the capitalist, and the workman is content to stand on the same level with his employer as far as the state is concerned. But where, as in other parts of the civilized world, the state, for some reason or the other, has determined on fostering th.3 existence of an industry which cannot exist without state help, or does not think it can, the workman is sure to attempt, with what success he can, either to appropriate a part of the ex traordinary profit which the Government, in the early stages of its action, accords to the capitalist, or to demand that an analogous benefit should be conferred on him by the opera tion of law. The protective system of Continental Europe is the source and the strength of European socialism, and is responsible for its fallacies and its excesses. Those Englishmen who lived through and watched the simultane ous energies of the Chartist movement and the free-trade agitation had abundant opportunities for inferring what turned out to be the fact, that the success of the latter movement would be a death-blow to the former project. When at the outbreak of the civil war in the United States a rigidly protective tariff was imposed on the Union in lieu of a more moderate system, those who had busied themselves with the phenomena of production and tho social relations of economical forces were able to predict that, apart from the more obvious evils which ensue from a false step in tho political economy of a nation, the attitude of labour towards capital would be aggressive, distrustful, and menacing, and that the mischief, when once generated, would be growing and permanent. Government in England interferes very little with the action of individuals, but this is possible because Government in England abstains as much as pos sible from meddling with those relations which can be made to adjust themselves. In England the adage of Mr J. S. Mill, that "the best remedy for the evils of liberty is more liberty," may be a wise generalization, but when the liberty of labour is curtailed, it is not quite so clear that a Government can with safety to itself dispense with that control from which English social life is happily free. The adoption of protectionist principles in civilized and industrial communities is undoubtedly an injury to such other communities as have adopted free-trade principles, because it curtails their market, and induces an uncertainty 750 as to whether the produce of their labour will find a sale. This mischief is exaggerated when the prohibitory or pro tecting tax is a variable amount. Thus during the existence of the English corn laws the foreign agriculturist was un able to foresee whether the demand for his produce in England, under the pressure of scarcity, would be admis sible for him at remunerative rates, and ho was consequently deterred from anticipating this demand. If indeed the de mand did arise, his gains might be enormous, provided he had it in his power to satisfy the demand. For example, at one time the sliding scale was fixed so high that foreign corn was admitted duty free only when the market prices in England marked 84s. a quarter. If such a price were reached, and the importer was in possession of a considerable stock, which he had been able to store in bond at 35s., ho could instantly take advantage of the situation, and greatly to his own advantage. It is true that such an occasional contingency did not compensate for the general insecurity of his industry, and the risk which he ran in waiting on a market into which he might never be able to enter. Hence the repeal of the English corn laws has given a very powerful stimulant to agricultural industry over the wholo world. Fixed duties do not operate so disastrously on foreign trade, even when the fixed duty is levied on such products as vary in quantity, and therefore in price, with the seasons. For in the vast majority of products values conform gene rally to the cost of production, and even in those which, like food, are determined also by the relations of demand and supply the wider the area is from which they are derived, the less are they liable to variation in supply, the element of demand being nearly a iiniform quantity. Still it must be remembered that all duties on imports check consumption, and, by implication, discourage production. The proof of this is seen in the fact that the reduction of any duty on an article in general demand is always followed by a rise in price, which continues till supply corresponds to the new demand. If therefore duties levied for the purposes of revenue have this effect, then, a fortiori, duties designedly imposed for the sake of protection will have a similar effect. If the protective enactment has any force at all, it must diminish the market of the country against which it is levelled. It may not be wholly effective, but it must have some effect. Thus, when under the Berlin and Milan decrees the first Napoleon strove to expel all British manufactures, and all the produce of the British colonies, from such parts of Europe as he could control, it is unques tionable that these decrees were a hindrance to British com merce, though to a considerable extent English manufac turers were able to elude them. Still tho country which adopts free trade has a great advantage in trade over such countries as adopt protection even in its commercial intercourse with them. There is no country which wishes to curtail the export of its raw materials, in the production of which it has natural advan tages, and of course it is equally willing to export its pro tected manufactures. Now it is plain that it would prefer to deal with a country which, unlike itself, imposes the least possible restraint on importation, and that the most advantageous market would be that in which no restraint at all was put. In order to use this market then, it will be content to offer its goods on the most favourable terms, and under the conditions of the strictest competition. It knows that a country which adopts free trade is best able to interpret its own demands, and its own power to satisfy the demand of other countries. Hence a free-trade country is a national entrepot, in which foreign goods are procurable at the lowest rates. In addition, as has been stated before, the country which puts no artificial restraint on its power of general purchase has always a great advantage in all com-