Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 9.djvu/796

760 FREE TRADE mercial transactions over a country which does put such a restraint on itself. Free trade then, as understood in England, means such a liberty of production and exchange as is unfettered by any of the restraints which have been imposed, in order that special industries may be artificially stimulated, by the machinery of a fiscal system. But there are other uses of the term which may be touched on, and in particular the application of it to labour and land. It was stated at the commencement of this article that Governments, in pursuance of their standing duty, that of protecting the weak against the strong, may and should put limits on free action as regards labour, and it is alleged that the expression free trade in land is a mis nomer. We shall attempt, in concluding this article, to givf) a brief explanation of the historical and other circum stances which have brought about the present state of things in England, and to define the economical conditions under which the relations of labour to production, and land to agriculture, are capable of an economical estimate. As the policy of ancient states did not attempt to control trade in the interest of their own citizens, so it did not hinder the individual in the prosecution of any industry. There is no evidence that the professions were practised by persons specially licensed for that purpose, and it is certain ihat the craftsmen of antiquity were not compelled to pass through a period of apprenticeship before they could follow their calling. In modern times, however, the practice of licensing the members of certain professions, and of exacting a period of servitude in all crafts and trades, under the name of apprenticeship, has been nearly universal. Up to comparatively recent times the same legal instrument was employed as a preliminary to the study of law and physic as was demanded from the trader and the artisan. The origin of the custom, which was assailed on principle by Adam Smith, is to be found in the history of the charters which were obtained by towns. These charters were pur chased from sovereigns or such lay and spiritual proprietors as possessed towns in fee. The privileges which such instruments conferred were considerable and valuable, were eagerly sought after and guarded with jealousy. Among the most important of these in England was the right of assuring, after a short uninterrupted residence within a walled town, the franchise of a free man to the resident serf. It was therefore expedient, and in order to avoid arousing any suspicion that the franchises of the town were abused, that some significant limit should be put on the acquisition of these privileges by individuals. Hence, at a very early period, guilds were established in chartered towns ; enrol ment in some guild became a necessary prelude to sharing the franchises of the town; and apprenticeship was made the condition under which persons could ordinarily enter the guild and practise the craft or trade. There is reason to believe that the customs of these trading companies put it into the power of those who administered the affairs of these companies to exercise a large and arbitrary control over all the members of the guild. The practice of apprenticeship began, in all likelihood, at an early date, but the earliest instruments which the writer has seen are of the 15th cen tury. It is only, of course, by accident that any have been preserved, since they had only a temporary and personal interest. In course of time the legislature exacted the condition of apprenticeship from all artisans and traders, notably by the Cth of Elizabeth, for during a long period it was the policy of the English parliament to put every pos sible hindrance on the migration of the agricultural labourer to the towns, and the most successful expedient by which this migration could be checked was that of imposing the servitude of apprenticeship on every one besides the agri cultural labourer. A custom then, which commenced with the interest which the trading company had in its chartered monopoly, and which closely resembled the machinery of the regulated companies for foreign trade, was strengthened and finally enforced by the parliament itself. In course of time the legislature abandoned its ancient policy, except in so far as it exacted from certain professions the equivalent of apprenticeship, on the ground that by so doing it pro tected the public against incompetence and fraud. The re tention of apprenticeship in certain kinds of manual labour is due to the action of trade unions, voluntary associations which occupy a somewhat similar position to the guild com panies of the Middle Ages, and which exercise an influence over a far larger number of persons than are formally con tained in the association. The object of apprenticeship in handicrafts is to maintain a high rate of wages by stinting the number of persons who are engaged in the occupation. Hence, and for the same reason, artisans object to the im portation of foreign labour, especially in such callings as are protected by apprenticeship. On no other ground, at least, would it be consistent to acquiesce in the importation of the products of labour and, by free trade in food, of what may be called the raw material of labour, and to object to the free circulation of labour itself. It is a question of merely speculative interest to ask whether a Government does wisely in restraining the prac tice of certain callings to those who have been certified to have passed through a preparatory training for the calling. It is only a little over sixty years since it put the restraint on medical practice, and the limits which have similarly been imposed on the legal profession originated in the recognition of certain persons only in certain courts of law. But there is no theoretical defence for the privilege accorded to such certified persons, except it be that by these means the public is protected from the danger of employing in competent practitioners. The police which the legislature exercises over unlicensed persons must not be supposed to be in the interests of those who are permitted to practice, but in that of those who employ professional services. There is, however, a tendency towards increasing the area over which this police is exercised, and latterly some public teachers, for example, who are employed in primary schools are made liable to the obligation of satisfying some public authority as to their competence for the work which they undertake. On the other hand, there are writers who argue that all such restraints are mischievous, not only because they control the choice of occupation, and are, therefore; invasions of natural and innocent liberty, but because they do not and cannot supply any proof of practical ability on the part of those who are certified, and because they weaken the habit of caution and prudence which all per sons should possess as far as possible in selecting those in whom they may place their confidence. Why, it may be asked, they say, should a lawyer be certified to carry on his calling on the ground that the trust reposed in him makes it expedient that the law should exercise a control over this calling, and a similar restraint be not extended over bankers, whose relations to their customers are even more delicate and confidential than those of lawyers 1 Again, there are callings in which no restraint is put on the choice of the calling, but an energetic control is exer cised over the practice of the calling, a control which sometimes extends so far as to prohibit some practices which are historically connected with the calling. Thus, since 1844, no new English bank is allowed to issue and circulate notes payable to bearer, such a note being vir tually a cheque payable at sight, and drawn by the banker on his own assets. The motive for putting this dis ability on bankers was to prevent the undue extension of a paper currency. But even though it may be doubted whether such a result was effected, or even that there was danger of such a result, the restraint on free action can be