sciences—in which case philosophy might well be content with the methods employed in mathematics and in the natural sciences.
But I prefer to turn to the question whether the method which Hegel and Croce attribute to philosophy has any real value in itself, and whether, if so, it is really unlike the other methods.
We must try, then, to understand this "philosophic thinking" which is different from all other activities of the mind, and which is one of those things against which—so Croce writes—"rebellion seems to me impossible, though I recognize that they should be taught more and more widely, since they constitute, as it were, the neglected a b c oi philosophy." But this a b c is by no means easy to understand, even when one brings to the task, as I have done, the utmost resolution and good will.
When I am told that philosophy is concerned with concepts, that is to say, with abstract notions and not with particular representations or personal sentiments, I can understand perfectly well; but when I am told that these concepts are not general concepts like those of science, but universal concepts, then I am lost. For if the term "universal concept" does not indicate, just as the term "general concept" does, certain qualities common to a definite and limited class of objects, what then can it indicate? The most
