probable explanation, to my mind, is that Croce gives the name "universal" to a certain number of general concepts which are distinguished from the concepts of the experimental sciences merely in that they have frequently been the object of study of certain men called philosophers. In this case the distinction would be merely apparent, or rather, would be historical rather than logical. But Croce certainly would not admit this interpretation, which, I must confess, reveals a lack of confidence in his analytical ability. I am compelled, therefore, to seek for some interpretation which might justify, at least to Croce's eyes, the establishment of a distinction between general concepts and universal concepts.
Croce's method, as all who have read his books are well aware, is primarily a process of elimination. He is careful to tell us that x is neither a nor b nor c, but he does not take the trouble to tell us what x really is. In the case in question he asserts that the universal concept is not the general concept—that is all. Since he does not even go on to say what a general concept is, we are justified in assuming that he is using the term "general concept" in its ordinary sense, that is, as a term indicating one or more characteristics common to a certain class of objects.
Now since Croce is endeavoring to establish a contrast between the universal concept and the general concept, the question naturally arises
