( 30 )
confederacy, results necessarily, by the most simple and demonstrable arguments, from the very nature of the relation subsisting between the states and general government. If it be conceded, as it must by every one who is the least conversant with our institutions, that the sovereign power is divided between the states and general government, and that the former holds its reserved rights, in the same high sovereign capacity, which the latter does its delegated rights; it will be impossible to deny to the states the right of deciding on the infraction of their rights, and the proper remedy to be applied for the correction. The right of judging, in such cases, is an essential attribute of sovereignty of which the states cannot be divested, without losing their sovereignty itself; and being reduced to a subordinate corporate condition. In fact, to divide power, and to give to one of the parties the exclusive right of judging of the portion allotted to each, is in reality not to divide at all; and to reserve such exclusive right to the general government, (it matters not by what department it be exercised,) is in fact to constitute it one great consolidated government, with unlimited powers, and to reduce the states to mere corporations. It is impossible to understand the force of terms, and to deny these conclusions. The opposite opinion can be embraced only on hasty and imperfect views of the relation existing between the states and the general government. But the existence of the right of judging of their powers, clearly established from the sovereignty of the states, as clearly implies a veto, or controul on the action of the general government on contested points of authority; and this very controul is the remedy, which the constitution has provided to prevent the encroachment of the general government on the reserved right of the states; and by the exercise of which, the distribution of power between the general and state governments, may be preserved forever inviolate, as is established by the constitution; and thus afford effectual protection to the great minor interest of the community, against the oppression of the majority.
Nor does this important conclusion stand on the deduction of reason alone, it is sustained by the highest contemporary authority.—Mr. Hamilton in the number of the Federalist, already cited, remarks, “that in a single republic all the powers surrendered by the people, are submitted to the administration of a single government; and usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into districts and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments; and then the portion allotted to each, sub-divided among districts and separate departments. Hence a double se-
