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The present Constitution itself was not framed and adopted in accordance with the directory provisions on that subject laid down in the former Constitution. But even the Legislature is not vested by the present Constitution with the power to call a Convention for such a purpose. Nor can the constitutional provisions which are relied on. prevent the people from exercising their sovereignty and power in calling a Convention, in their own name, instead of going through the machinery of a legislative body, whenever they choose to do so, especially in a time of war and treason on the part of their agents. No, the people of the State have a right to act thus, and if they wish again to enjoy peace, happiness and prosperity, the sooner they call this Convention and make a new Constitution, the better.

The present Constitution of the State is unjust to the city of New Orleans; discriminates unfairly between the slaveholder and the poor man, and is a barrier to the spirit of progress and humanity in our midst. It is, emphatically, the slaveholders’ Constitution. The poor men of the State, recognizing it as the enactment of a majority, submit to it like good Democrats. But as the slaveholders themselves were the first to disregard and throw it aside, and to join in the rebellion, they cannot complain when we, who are in favor of the Union, are also desirous of setting it aside and making a new one to suit ourselves. Turn about is fair play.

I do not base my opposition to the present Constitution on its pro-slavery features exclusively. It has many other serious defects. I and, I believe, every member of the bar in this city, object to the election of judges by the people. The respect and sanctity which should envelop the judicial robes forbid the ermine from mingling in the strifes of party contests. We want no judges on the bench elected by party spirit and carrying with them party prejudices. The appointment of judges by the Governor, and their confirmation by the Senate, will, of course, be somewhat influenced by party politics; but in such case the large number of litigants appearing before them will not be known as either friends or opponents of the judges, as they bad no direct agency in their appointment, and can, therefore, reasonably expect impartial justice from the courts. From the experience we have had under an elective judiciary since the adoption of the present Constitution, I do not know of a single individual in this city, of any respectable standing, who is not in favor of a change in the mode of selecting our judiciary.

But the most serious objection to the present Constitution, and that which came near defeating it before the people in 1852, is that arising from the basis of representation which it prescribes. Article eighth commences thus: “Representation in the House of Representatives shall be equal and uniform, and shall be regulated and ascertained by the total population of each of the several parishes of the State.” The iniquity of this provision can best be illustrated by supposing an example. Suppose the basis under this provision be fixed at one representative for every fifteen thousand inhabitants of all colors and conditions, and that the Parish of Jefferson has fifteen thousand inhabitants, all white and free, and the Parish of Assumption fifteen thousand inhabitants, of whom fourteen thousand nine hundred and eighty are slaves, and the other twenty are white men. Do you not see that in such a case the twenty white men in a slaveholding parish have the same vote and influence in the House as the fifteen thousand white persons in what might be termed the “freesoil” parish?

Is this fair and just to the small planters and farmers, the adventurous frontiersmen, the honest mechanics, hard labors, the enterprising manufacturers and merchants and the