was inapplicable to him because his sentence had been vacated and that the penalty provision of the FSMA was inapplicable to him because it was not retroactive. The circuit court ruled that the FSMA applied to Harris and sentenced him to a term of life with the possibility of parole after thirty years. A new sentencing order was entered, and Harris timely filed a notice of appeal.
III. Arguments and Analysis
On appeal, Harris contends that his case is controlled by the precedent set forth in Jackson and Gordon and that the FSMA does not apply to him. Further, he raises constitutional challenges to the FSMA. To resolve the issues in this case, we must construe the FSMA. The question of the correct application and interpretation of an Arkansas statute is a question of law which this court decides de novo. E.g., Worsham v. Bassett, 2016 Ark. 146, 489 S.W.3d 162.
In arguing that the FSMA applies to Harris, the State primarily relies on a provision of the act that sets forth parole eligibility for juveniles. This provision is codified at Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-621, which is entitled "Parole eligibility—A person who was a minor at the time of committing an offense that was committed before, on, or after March 20, 2017." See FSMA § 13. Section 16-93-621(a)(2), which pertains to those juveniles who committed capital and first-degree murder, states,
(2)(A) A minor who was convicted and sentenced to the department for an offense committed before he or she was eighteen (18) years of age, in which the death of another person occurred, and that was committed before, on, or after March 20, 2017, is eligible for release on parole no later than after twenty-five (25) years of incarceration if he or she was convicted of murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102, or
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