Page:Harris v. State (2018 Ark. 179).pdf/9

This page has been validated.

that if the Act was not retroactive, then Harris should be sentenced in accordance with this court's decision in Jackson, which provided a range of ten to forty years' imprisonment or life.

Harris then filed a motion for resentencing under Jackson and Gordon and asserted that the circuit court should grant him a resentencing hearing to present Miller evidence, then resentence him within the discretionary range of ten to forty years or life. He further asserted that applying the current punishment under the FSMA would violate Jackson and Gordon, the purpose of the FSMA, and a host of federal and state constitutional provisions.^[1]

The circuit court held a hearing on May 8, 2017. The State argued that, pursuant to the FSMA, Harris should be sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after thirty years. Harris reiterated his argument that he was entitled to resentencing pursuant to this court's decision in Jackson. He maintained that the parole-eligibility provision of the FSMA

↑ Specifically, Harris contended that (1) the legislature did not intend the new sentence for juvenile capital murder to apply retroactively, (2) this court has already held that Miller is not satisfied by summarily resentencing a Miller defendant to life with the possibility of parole, (3) treating a defendant differently than other Miller defendants already resentenced is "patently unfair" and denies "fundamental fairness and evenhanded justice," (4) treating a defendant differently than other Miller defendants already resentenced would violate the federal and state equality clauses, (5) the federal and state ex post facto clauses forbid cutting the punishment range from (a) ten to forty years or life to (b) life only, (6) a defendant is entitled to individualized resentencing by "judge or jury," and a parole hearing does not suffice, (7) retroactively applying the new punishment for juvenile capital murder makes the FSMA an unconstitutional bill of attainder, and (8) applying sections 3 and 6 of the FSMA retroactively makes the statute "special" legislation forbidden by the state constitution.

9

[1] Specifically, Harris contended that (1) the legislature did not intend the new sentence for juvenile capital murder to apply retroactively, (2) this court has already held that Miller is not satisfied by summarily resentencing a Miller defendant to life with the possibility of parole, (3) treating a defendant differently than other Miller defendants already resentenced is "patently unfair" and denies "fundamental fairness and evenhanded justice," (4) treating a defendant differently than other Miller defendants already resentenced would violate the federal and state equality clauses, (5) the federal and state ex post facto clauses forbid cutting the punishment range from (a) ten to forty years or life to (b) life only, (6) a defendant is entitled to individualized resentencing by "judge or jury," and a parole hearing does not suffice, (7) retroactively applying the new punishment for juvenile capital murder makes the FSMA an unconstitutional bill of attainder, and (8) applying sections 3 and 6 of the FSMA retroactively makes the statute "special" legislation forbidden by the state constitution.

[1]