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THE NATURE OF CONSIDERATION, 263 gave the plaintiff another note for the same amount, in consider- ation that the plaintiff would pay his note to the bank, which the plaintiff did. In a suit upon this second note, the defendant con- tended that his note was without consideration because the plaintiff was already bound in law to pay his own note to the bank, although it was an accommodation note given for another. But the defence was not sustained ; Mr. Justice Allen saying, after citing many cases bearing on the subject, " It seems to us better to hold as a general rule, that if A has refused or hesitated to perform an agreement with B, and is requested to do so by C, who will derive a benefit from such performance, and who promises to pay him a certain sum therefor, and A thereupon undertakes to do it, the performance by A of his agreement in consequence of such re- quest and promise by C is a good consideration to support C's promise." This is very carefully stated, and due prominence is given to the important facts that A has refused to perform his agreement with B, that C is pecuniarily interested in such performance, and that A is finally induced to perform it by the promise of C. Brownell v. Lowe,^ sometimes cited as contra ^ tends on the other hand, so far as it goes, to sustain the same view. There the plain- tiff had contracted with a railroad company to build a section of the road, the work not to commence until the company had provided the means of making payments according to the terms of the con- tract. The company not having provided sufficient means of pay- ment, the plaintiffs refused to proceed with the work. Thereupon, the defendants, being interested in the performance of the work, promised the plaintiffs to pay them the money, and the work was completed. The defendants were held bound by the promise, notwithstanding this defence was set up. In some other cases, cited in opposition to this view, in 8 Har- vard Law Review, 27, there was no apparent benefit to the promisor, nor any loss to the promisee ; that is, no loss which he was not already under obligation to undergo. Of course, there- fore, no such promise could be held valid. Thus, in Davenport v. First Congregational Society ,2 which was a promise by the plaintiff to relinquish his claim against a religious society, if they would promptly pay a former pastor what was due him, which they did. In such case there was neither loss to the promisee (the society) nor gain to the promisor. 1 117 Ind. 420 (1888). 2 33 Wis. 387.