Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/448

428 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. question arose as to the truth of the articles. The Supreme Court in the course of their opinion pointed out that the statements were objectionable only because they purported to state the amount of the oflfers of settle- ment — that this would not have been admissible in evidence at the trial, and so the natural and probable effect of it was to influence the court and jury improperly in the determination of the amount of damages in the cause. There can be no question of the correctness of the decision, but it is novel and interesting because of the emphasis which is put upon the fact that the offers of compromise which were reported would have been inadmissible as evidence. It is perhaps idle to expect — though not too much to require — that the paper which undertakes to deal with legal matters will make itself acquainted with the general rules of evidence. The case is a sign-post of real value. Criminal Negligence, — The fatalities among infants caused by the vagaries of the sect known as the Peculiar People, a species of Christian Scientists, raise an interesting point in criminal law. At the trial on November 12 last of two of their number for the manslaughter of their infant child, Regina v. Felton, noted in The Lav/ Journal, Nov. 19, 1898, it appeared that, though the child was ailing from its birth, its parents merely anointed it with oil in the name of the Lord. The post-mortem showed that the summons of a physician would have saved the infant's life. Mr. Justice Hawkins ruled that, if the defendants acted in the honest belief that they were doing their duty, they were not guilty of man- slaughter. And so the jury found. The question whether the criminal law should accept the standard of the man of ordinary prudence, adopted on the civil side in cases of negligence, was squarely raised. Negligence is one way of supplying a sufficient criminal intent to make a criminal act punishable. It is, then, of the first importance that some test be found by which the conduct of each defendant may be measured. There seem two possible rules. The first, which is the doctrine of the English cases, sets up what might be termed an internal standard. A man is judged by the actual condition of his mind as regards conse- quences — if he does not do his best according to his own lights, he is criminally negligent. Regina v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox C. C. 530. A more recent English decision, while recognizing a common law immunity, was driven to a different result by 31 & 32 Vict. c. 122, § 37, which made it an offence for a parent wilfully to neglect to provide adequate medical aid for a child under fourteen years in his custody. Regina v. Downes, 13 Cox C. C. III. A breach of this duty imposed by law, in itself a crime, supplied all the elements of manslaughter when it led directly to the death of a human being. The repeal of this statute by 52 & 53 Vict, c. 44, § 18, later consolidated vnth amendments in 57 & 58 Vict. c. 41, cleared the way for the direct application of common law principles to the present case. It is interesting to note that, since Mr. Justice Haw- kins' ruling, section i of the latter statute has been so construed by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved as to restore the statutory law to the condition in which Regina v. Downes found it. Regina v. Senior, reported in The Law Journal, Dec. 17, 1898. But, apart from statute, the inter- nal standard of guilt is the one adopted at common law by the English courts. The other rule by which a defendant may be judged is that employed