Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 5.djvu/356

340 HAR VARD LA W RE VIE W. " public purpose," and further that, on account of the limited powers of the general government and the large " reserved powers " of the States, the number of the objects for which the State can tax is largely in excess of the fewer, though possibly more generally important, objects for which the federal govern- ment may do so. Indeed, the proposition that federal taxation must be for a public purpose is substantially agreed to by the attorney-general in the very next paragraph of his brief (p. 69) : The difference between what constitutes a " public purpose " for a municipality and for the government of the United States is illus- trated, etc. If this be so, it is not perceived why the State authorities are not strictly applicable. These cases not only declare that all tax- ation is necessarily limited to " public purposes," but limit the meaning of that phrase by a broad and general definition ; viz., that to confer direct pecuniary benefits upon an industry or indi- vidual for the sake of an incidental or resulting general advantage is not a "public purpose." The relation of the State courts to their State constitutions is substantially the same as that existing between the federal Supreme Court and Congress. And it is to be observed further that the State decisions frequently treat such legislation, independent of constitutions, as being in violation of natural right. There are limitations imposed upon the legis- lature " by the general principles supposed to limit all legislative power." (Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 132.) It would seem that natural rights must be the same, whether against legis- lation by Congress or by the legislature of the State. 1 This is especially important in view of the fact that Congress can do nothing which the Constitution does not first sanction. If a power be denied to the State, a fortiori t may be presumed to have been denied to Congress. 2 In defining the meaning of the limitation imposed upon the congressional power of taxation, viz., " public purpose," and in defining the natural rights of the citizen under any government, it seems difficult to avoid the force of the State decisions. 1 Calder v. Bull, 3 DaH. 386; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters, 627, 657; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610, 623; Hammett v. Phila., 65 Pa. St. 146, 151. 2 1 Story, Const. § 909 ; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 55°. 551-