Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 5.djvu/357

THE SUGAR BOUNTIES. 341 j. Congressional Action. The contention that "public purpose" for the taxation by Congress means something different than the same phrase when applied to State taxation is sustained, in the opinion of the attorney-general, by instances in which Congress has expended moneys for bounties to people in this and other countries. The list is taken from a speech of Senator Daniel on the Blair Educa- tional Bill (21 Cong. Record, pt. 3, 2295) in 1890. There are about forty instances cited, of which thirty-three are for the relief of sufferers by fire, earthquake, including one at Venezuela, Indian depredations, overflow of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, cyclones, yellow fever, grasshoppers, lack of seed by failure of crops, or from accidents at arsenals. Congress has also appropriated money to transport supplies to Ireland (9 Stats, at Large, 207 ; 21 Ibid. 303), to the South (14 Stats, at Large, 567; 15 Ibid. 24), to France and Germany (16 Stats, at Large, 596), usually in government vessels. It will be observed that these are all matters of national charity, were not judicially examined or even seriously challenged in debate, and were never for large amounts. They were from funds already in the Treasury. The excellence of their objects, and the fact that no one in particular cared to, or could, bring the matter to the attention of the court, seem at least partially to explain these instances of national generosity. Logically con- sidered, they tend to prove, so far as they prove anything, that the power of Congress to tax is absolutely unfettered. For example, to either a narrow or latitudinarian constructionist of the Con- stitution, it would be difficult to prove that taxation for sending food to sufferers by earthquake in Venezuela was for the "general welfare of the United States." To these instances may perhaps be added the "codfish bounty" (1 Stats, at Large, 229), practically a drawback upon the duty on salt, and various other drawbacks under different revenue statutes. 1 It may be observed as an interesting fact that these Acts are frequent during periods of "protective" tariffs, as 1804-1847 or 1863-1890, while there are no instances of this sort of legislation in the period of "revenue tariff," between 1847 and 1861 ; and further 1 See 6 Stats, at Large, 13; 1 Story, Const., § 991; 3 Hamilton's Works, p. 192; 3 Madison's Works, 636-648; 1 Stats, at Large, 387; 2 Stats, at Large, 84; 3 Stats, at Large, 36; 21 Cong. Record, p. 9592; I Stats, at Large, 27.