Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/380

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35 8 KANT. relates to concepts or to pure or empirical intuitions — is an ai^'pf the miderstanding ; it cannot be given by objects, but only spontaneously, perforjnejd by the subject itself, ^f^- We cannot represent anything as connected in the object unless we have ourselves first connected it. The connection includes th ree conceptions ;; that of the manifold to be connected (which is given by intuition), that of the act of synt hesis, and that of the uni ty; this last is two-fold, an objective unity (the conception of an object in general in which the manifold is united), and a subjective unity (the unity of consciousness under which or, rather, through which the connection is effected). The categories represent the different kinds of combination, each one of these, again, being completed in three~^fages, which are termed the y Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition, the Synthesis of ^'Reproduction in Imagination, and the Synthesis of Recogni- y'tion in Concepts. If I wish to think the time from one ' noon to the next, I must (i) grasp (apprehend) the manifold representations (portions of time) in succession ; (2) retain or renew (reproduce) in thought those which have pre- ceded in passing to those which follow ; (3) be conscious that that which is now thought is the same with that thought before, or know again (recognize) the reproduced representation as the one previously experienced. If the mind did not exercise such synthetic activity the manifold of representation would not constitute a whole^ would lack the unity which consciousness alone can impart to it. Without this gne c onsciousness, concepts and kn^ivledge of objects would be wholly impossible. The unity of pure self-consciousness or of "transcendental apperception" is the postulate of all use of the" undersiafTdTng. In the flux of internal phenomena there is no constant or abiding self, but the unchangeable consciousness here demanded is a precedent condition of all experience, and gives to phef nomena a connection according to laws which determine ati object for intuition, i. e., the conception of something in which they are necessarily connected.* Reference to an

  • Object is "that which opposes the random or arbitrary determination of oor

cognitions," and which causes " them to be determined in a certain way a priori." i i