SCHEMATISM. 359 object is nothing other than the necessary unity of con- sciousness. The connective activity of the understanding, and with it experience, is possible only through "the syn- thetic unity of pure apperception," the " I think," which must be able to accompany all my representations, and tfTrough which they first become jnine. Experience (in the strict sense) is distinguished from perception (experience in the wide sense) by its objectivity or universal validity. y'A judgment of perception (the sun shines upon the stone and the stone becomes warm) is only subjectively valid ; while, on the other hand, a judg- ment of experience (the sun warms the stone) aims to be valid not only forme and my present condition, but always,
for me and for everyone else. If the former is to become
the latter, an a priori concept must be added to the perception (in the above case, the concept of cause), under which the perception is subsumed. The category deter- mines the perceptions in view of the form of the judgment, gives to the judgment its reference to an object, and thus gives to the percepts, or rather, concepts (sunshine and warmth), necessary_and_universally^.valid connection. The "reason why the judgments of others" must "agree with mine " is " the unity of the object to which they all relate, with which they agree, and hence must also all agree with one another." Though the categories take their origin in the nature of _ Jhe subject, they are objective and valid for objects of experience, because ^expfirience is possible alone through them. They are not the product, but the ground of expe- rrerice. The second difficulty concerns their applicability - to phenomena, which are wholly disparate. By what ■ means is the gulf between the categories, which are con- cepts and a/rz£W._aiid4Derceptions, which are intuitous and • empirical, bridged over? The connecting link is supplied i by the imag^ination , as the faculty which mediates between I s ensibilit y and nnHprgf^pding to provide a concept with its image, and consists in the intuition of time, which, • in common with the categories, has an a priori character, and, in common with perceptions, an intuitive charac- ter, so that it is at once pure and sensuous. The sub- V
