Page:Interim Staff Report on Investigation into Risky MPXV Experiment at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.pdf/3

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Executive Summary

Since October 2022, the Committee on Energy and Commerce’s Republican Members (E&C or the Committee) have been investigating a research project on MPXV, a virus that causes mpox (formerly known as “monkeypox”), planned and/or conducted at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID). Under Rule X clause 1(f) of the U.S. House of Representatives, E&C is the committee with jurisdiction over public health agencies, including NIAID’s parent agency, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and federal biomedical research. The Committee has a long history of conducting oversight of federally funded virology research, including investigating accidents at high-containment laboratories, and examining federal policies related to biosecurity, biosafety, and potentially risky experiments.^[1]

A September 15, 2022, Science magazine article on MPXV included an interview with Dr. Bernard Moss, a preeminent pox virologist who has worked for decades at NIAID and is a NIH Distinguished Investigator.^[2] In the interview, Dr. Moss noted he and his colleagues had

↑ This includes investigating the circumstances around the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) discovery of unregistered and improperly stored smallpox vials in a cold storage room the agency then used at the NIH in 2014 in violation of international agreements limiting retention of smallpox in the United States to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and in Russia at the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology, also known as the Vector Institute. See Concerns over Federal Select Agent Program Oversight of Dangerous Pathogens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 115th Cong. (Nov. 2, 2017); Bioresearch Labs and Inactivation of Dangerous Pathogens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2016), CHRG-114hhrg23012.pdf (govinfo.gov); How Secure are U.S. Bioresearch Labs? Preventing the Next Safety Lapse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. (Apr. 20, 2016), CHRG114hhrg20712.pdf (govinfo.gov); Outbreaks, Attacks, and Accidents: Combatting Biological Threats: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. (Feb. 12, 2016), CHRG-114hhrg25164.pdf (govinfo.gov); Review of CDC Anthrax Lab Incident: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. (July 16, 2014), CHRG-113hhrg92323.pdf (govinfo.gov); Bioresearch Labs and Inactivation of Dangerous Pathogens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2016), CHRG-114hhrg23012.pdf (govinfo.gov).
↑ Kai Kupferschmidt, Moving Target: The Global Monkeypox Outbreak is the Virus an Unprecedented Opportunity to Adapt to Humans. Will it Change for the Worse? Science (Sept. 16, 2022), https://www.science.org/content/article/will-monkeypox-virus-become-more-dangerous.

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[1] This includes investigating the circumstances around the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) discovery of unregistered and improperly stored smallpox vials in a cold storage room the agency then used at the NIH in 2014 in violation of international agreements limiting retention of smallpox in the United States to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and in Russia at the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology, also known as the Vector Institute. See Concerns over Federal Select Agent Program Oversight of Dangerous Pathogens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 115th Cong. (Nov. 2, 2017); Bioresearch Labs and Inactivation of Dangerous Pathogens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2016), CHRG-114hhrg23012.pdf (govinfo.gov); How Secure are U.S. Bioresearch Labs? Preventing the Next Safety Lapse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. (Apr. 20, 2016), CHRG114hhrg20712.pdf (govinfo.gov); Outbreaks, Attacks, and Accidents: Combatting Biological Threats: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. (Feb. 12, 2016), CHRG-114hhrg25164.pdf (govinfo.gov); Review of CDC Anthrax Lab Incident: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. (July 16, 2014), CHRG-113hhrg92323.pdf (govinfo.gov); Bioresearch Labs and Inactivation of Dangerous Pathogens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2016), CHRG-114hhrg23012.pdf (govinfo.gov).

[2] Kai Kupferschmidt, Moving Target: The Global Monkeypox Outbreak is the Virus an Unprecedented Opportunity to Adapt to Humans. Will it Change for the Worse? Science (Sept. 16, 2022), https://www.science.org/content/article/will-monkeypox-virus-become-more-dangerous.

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