swapped dozens of genes from the much more transmissible, but less deadly, clade II MPXV into the more deadly clade I MPXV. The article stated that the Moss team was “planning to try the opposite, endowing clade II virus with genes from its deadlier relative.”[1] The proposal to transfer genes from the deadlier clade I into the more transmissible clade II alarmed some scientists who believed a more potent version of the mpox outbreak strain could spark an epidemic that would be substantially more lethal.[2]
In oversight requests to the NIH, E&C sought information to better understand the potential risks and benefits of the experiment Dr. Moss had described in the Science magazine interview, in particular the proposal to transfer genes from clade I into clade II. As described by Dr. Moss, the experiment appeared to qualify as gain-of-function research of concern (GOFROC) because it planned to enhance the transmissibility and pathogenicity of clade II MPXV by inserting genes from clade I MPXV.[3] Moreover, it also appeared to implicate federal policies or practices regarding dual-use research of concern (DURC) by utilizing gene transferring techniques that, if misapplied, pose a significant threat to public health and human safety.[4]
Over a period of 18 months, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the NIH, and NIAID repeatedly obstructed and misled the Committee about whether the transfer of genes from clade I into clade II experiments described by Dr. Moss in the Science article had been approved or conducted. Initially, HHS and the NIH refused to answer any questions about the research. HHS also refused to provide most of the requested documents to the Committee unless they had already been made public. Eventually, some requested documents were made accessible, but only if Committee staff went to HHS offices to review these documents in camera. To the extent HHS and the NIH provided briefings, documents, or document viewings, it was almost always to avoid either a transcribed interview or a subpoena.
- ↑ Id.
- ↑ Jocelyn Kaiser, Making Trouble, Science (Oct. 19, 2022), https://www.science.org/content/article/u-s-weighs-crackdown-experiments-could-make-viruses-more-dangerous.
- ↑ Todd Kuiken, Cong. Research Serv., IF12021, Global Pandemics: Gain-of-Function Research of Concern, (2022), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12021.
- ↑ U.S. Health & Human Serv., Public Health Emergency, Science Safety Security, Dual Use Research of Concern (last updated June 3, 2021), https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Pages/default.aspx.
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