Page:JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia.pdf/61

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Gummow J

51.

The passage in their Honours' reasons in Mutual Pools reads[1]:

"Nonetheless, the fact remains that s 51(xxxi) is directed to 'acquisition' as distinct from deprivation. The extinguishment, modification or deprivation of rights in relation to property does not of itself constitute an acquisition of property[2]. For there to be an 'acquisition of property', there must be an obtaining of at least some identifiable benefit or advantage relating to the ownership or use of property. On the other hand, it is possible to envisage circumstances in which an extinguishment, modification or deprivation of the proprietary rights of one person would involve an acquisition of property by another by reason of some identifiable and measurable countervailing benefit or advantage accruing to that other person as a result[3]."

Deane and Gaudron JJ were distinguishing two species of benefit, each sufficient for an "acquisition". The first would be exemplified by the acquisition of land by a resuming authority, where what was taken was received by the authority. The second would be exemplified by cases of a countervailing benefit or advantage of a proprietary nature. An example is the benefit or advantage to the obligee of an extinguished or modified chose in action, as in Georgiadis[4] and ANL[5]. In the latter case, Gleeson CJ said that the combined legal effect of the two statutory provisions in question was that "the appellant's pre-existing common law right was modified; and a corresponding benefit was conferred on the respondent"[6].


  1. (1994) 179 CLR 155 at 185.
  2. See British Medical Association v The Commonwealth (1949) 79 CLR 201 at 270–271 per Dixon J; the Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1 at 145–146 per Mason J, 181–182 per Murphy J, 247–248 per Brennan J, 283 per Deane J; Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd v The Commonwealth (1993) 176 CLR 480 at 528 per Dawson and Toohey JJ. It is relevant to note that the Privy Council has also, in the context of interpreting the Malaysian Constitution, drawn a distinction between deprivations and acquisitions: Government of Malaysia v Selangor Pilot Association [1978] AC 337 at 347–348.
  3. See, generally, the Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1 at 283–284.
  4. (1994) 179 CLR 297.
  5. (2000) 204 CLR 493.
  6. (2000) 204 CLR 493 at 500 [7].