Page:JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia.pdf/62

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Gummow J

52.

That is the sense in which the passage in the reasons of Deane and Gaudron JJ in Mutual Pools was understood by French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ in ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth[1].

The outcome

In oral submissions the Commonwealth placed at the forefront of its arguments first that no "property" had been "taken" and, secondly, that in any event there had been no "acquisition" of "property". The upshot is that the Commonwealth should succeed on the second of these grounds.

That makes it unnecessary to rule upon two further and related submissions by the Commonwealth. The first is that there is no contextual, structural or historical reason to treat every transfer of property as an acquisition to which s 51(xxxi) applies where the transfer is "incidental to regulation in the public interest". The second proposition is that s 51(xxxi) has no operation where the acquisition of property without compensation "is no more than a necessary consequence or incident of a restriction on a commercial trading activity … reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce harm caused by that trading activity to members of the public or public health".

These submissions bring to mind remarks by Brandeis J in his dissenting reasons in Pennsylvania Coal Company v Mahon[2]:

"Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking."

It is sufficient for present purposes to say that propositions of the width of those put by the Commonwealth have not so far been endorsed by decisions of this Court and that whether such propositions should be accepted would require most careful consideration on an appropriate occasion.


  1. (2009) 240 CLR 140 at 179–180 [82]–[84].
  2. 260 US 393 at 417 (1922). See also as to this aspect of the "police power" what was said for the Court by Brennan J in Andrus v Allard 444 US 51 at 67–68 (1979) and the differing views expressed respectively by Stevens J (for the majority) and Rehnquist CJ (for the minority) in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v DeBenedictis 480 US 470 at 485–493, 512–513 (1987).