nical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not ſeparated from the legiſlative and executive powers: were it joined with the legiſlative, the life and liberty of the citizens would be expoſed to arbitrary controul; for the judge would then be legiſlator: were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppreſſor.
There would be an end of every thing (tout ſeroit perdu) were the ſame man, or the ſame body, whether of princes, of the nobles, or of the people, to exerciſe thoſe three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public reſolutions, and that of judging the crimes or differences of individuals.
Moſt kingdoms in Europe enjoy a moderate government, becauſe the prince, who is inveſted with the two firſt powers, leaves the third to his ſubjects. In Turkey, where theſe three powers are united in the ſultan's perſon, the ſubjects groan under the weight of a moſt frightful oppreſſion. In the republics of Italy, where theſe three powers are united, there is leſs liberty than in our monarchies. Hence their government is obliged to have recourſe to as violent methods for its ſupport, as even that of the Turks; witneſs the ſtate inquiſitors at Venice, and the lion's mouth, into which every informer may at all hours throw his written accuſations: what a ſituation muſt the poor citizen be in under thoſe poor republics! The fame body of magiſtrates are poſſeſſed, as executors of the laws, of the whole power they have given themſelves in quality of legiſlators. They might plunder the ſtate by their general determinations; and as they have likewiſe the judiciary power in their hands, every private
