citizen may be ruined by their particular deciſions. The whole power is here united in one body; and though there is no external pomp that indicates a deſpotic ſway, yet the people feel the effects of it every moment.
Hence it is, that many of the princes of Europe, whoſe aim has been levelled at arbitrary power, have conſtantly ſet out with uniting in their own perſons all the branches of magiſtracy, and all the great offices of ſtate.
I allow, indeed, that the mere hereditary ariſtocracy of the Italian republicks, does not anſwer exactly to the deſpotic power of the eaſtern princes. The number of magiſtrates ſometimes loſtens the power of the magiſtracy; the whole body of the nobles do not always concur in the ſame deſigns; and different tribunals are erected that temper each other. Thus, at Venice, the legiſlative power is in the council, the executive in the pregadi, and the judiciary in the quarantia. But the miſchief is, that theſe different tribunals are compoſed of magiſtrates all belonging to the ſame body; which conſtitutes almoſt one and the ſame power.
The judiciary power ought not to be given to a ſtanding ſenate; it ſhould be exerciſed by perſons taken from the body of the people, as at Athens, at certain times of the year, and purſuant to a form and manner preſcribed by law, in order to erct a tribunal that ſhould laſt only as long as neceſſity requires.
By this means the power of judging, a power ſo terrible to mankind, not being annexed to any particular ſtate or proſeſſion, becomes, as it were, inviſible. People have not then the judges continually preſent to their view; they fear the office, but not the magiſtrate.
