In accuſations of a deep or criminal nature, it is proper the perſon accuſed ſhould have the privilege of chuſing, in ſome meaſure, his judges, in concurrence with the law? or, at leaſt, he ſhould have a right to except againſt ſo great a number, that the remaining part may be deemed his own choice. The other two powers may be given rather to magiſtrates or permanent bodies, becauſe they are not exerciſed on any private ſubject; one being no more than the general will of the ſtate, and the other the execution of that general will.
But though the tribunals ought not to be fixed, yet the judgments ought, and to ſuch a degree as to be always conformable to the exact letter of the law. Were they to be the private opinion of the judge, people would then live in ſociety without knowing exactly the obligations it lays them under.
The judges ought likewiſe to be in the ſame ſtation as the accuſed, or, in other words, his peers, to the end that he may not imagine he is fallen into the hands of perſons inclined to treat him with rigour.
If the legiſlative leaves the executive power in poſſeſſion of a right to impriſon thoſe ſubjects who can give ſecurity for their good behaviour, there is an end of liberty; unleſs they are taken up, in order to anſwer, without delay, to a capital crime; in this caſe they are really free, being ſubject only to the power of the law.
But ſhould the legiſlature think itſelf in danger, by ſome ſecret conſpiracy againſt the ſtate, or by a correſpondence with a foreign enemy, it might authoriſe the executive power, for a ſhort and limited time, to impriſon ſuſpected perſons; who, in that caſe, would loſe their liberty only for a while, to preſerve it for ever. And this is the
