not been raised, but a highway had been opened by Kábul to Persia and to Russia. The situation, so far as lord Auckland could at that time see it, was this. On the one side the Cabinet of Great Britain had failed to establish its influence with the Court of Persia. On the other, the Indian Government had been baffled in Kábul. The efforts made, on either hand, during the two years which had elapsed since the despatch of June 25, 1836, was penned, had signally failed. Neither at Herát nor in Kábul had British policy succeeded in its aims. Mr. McNeill was discredited in Persia, and Captain Burnes had been withdrawn from Afghánistán. It could not be known at Simla what course would be pursued by the Cabinet in its discomfiture; but the time had arrived when it seemed unavoidable that, for his part, Lord Auckland should 'interfere decidedly in the affairs of Afghánistán.'
On May 12, 1838, the Governor-General put the position before himself in a Minute, and recorded the measures which he thought it best to take. The Minute has been published in Blue-books, and space does not admit of its being inserted here. Reviewing at great length the events which had led to the situation as it then stood, Lord Auckland proceeded to consider the several courses open to him. His policy had been to replace the Persian alliance of 1814 by a belt of defence consisting of allied native States on the frontier — by a 'rampart,' as he called it — and to leave the British Cabinet to regain by
