diplomacy its influence in Teherán. That having failed, interference from India might become necessary. But it need not necessarily be the interference of the Government of India. If Dost Muhammad would not join the alliance, he must make room for another. Lord Auckland now looked to making use of the agency of Ranjít Singh and Sháh Shujá. It was not unless the former declined to be made use of, or the latter was found to be unequal to the task of recovering for himself his kingdom, that direct British agency could be thought of. Even should this become necessary, he wrote later to Sir John Hobhouse, 'a friendly power and an intimate connexion in Afghánistán, a peaceful alliance with Lahore, and an established influence in Sind, are objects for which some hazards may well be run.'
'I would not commit myself now,' Lord Auckland wrote, 'to any course of action. But we must prepare to meet the serious difficulty which is hanging over us with a promptitude adequate to the occasion; and it is well, therefore, to follow out the several plans which are open to us in some fullness of detail. If Persia should succeed against Herát, and advance upon Eastern Afghánistán, we have, as it appears to me, but three courses to follow: the first, to confine our defensive measures to the line of the Indus, and to leave Afghánistán to its fate; the second, to attempt to save Afghánistán by granting succour to the existing Chiefships of Kábul and Kandahár; the third, to permit or to encourage the advance of Ranjít Singh's armies upon Kábul under counsel and restriction, and (as subsidiary to his advance) to organize an expedition headed by Sháh Shujá-
