Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol II).djvu/27

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CH. VII.]
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS.
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quent recurrence to questions respecting the fundamental principles of government.[1] Whoever has been present in any assembly, convened for such a purpose, must have perceived the great diversities of opinion upon the most vital questions; and the extreme difficulty in bringing a majority to concur in the long-sighted wisdom of the soundest provisions. Temporary feelings and excitements, popular prejudices, an ardent love of theory, an enthusiastic temperament, inexperience, and ignorance, as well as preconceived opinions, operate wonderfully to blind the judgment, and seduce the understanding. It will probably be found, in the history of most conventions of this sort, that the best and soundest parts of the constitution, those, which give it permanent value, as well as safe and steady operation, are precisely those, which have enjoyed the least of the public favour at the moment, or were least estimated by the framers. A lucky hit, or a strong figure, has not unfrequently overturned the best reasoned plan. Thus, Dr. Franklin's remark, that a legislature, with two branches, was a wagon, drawn by a horse before, and a horse behind, in opposite directions, is understood to have been decisive in inducing Pennsylvania, in her original constitution, to invest all the legislative power in a single body.[2] In her present constitution, that error has been fortunately corrected. It is not believed, that the clause in the constitution of Vermont providing for a septennial council of censors to inquire into the infractions of her constitution during the last septenary, and to recommend suitable measures to the legislature, and to call,
  1. The Federalist, No. 48, 50.
  2. 1 Adams's American Constitutions, 105, 106.