20
CONSTITUTION OF THE U. STATES.
[BOOK III.
if they see fit, a convention to amend the constitution, has been of any practical advantage in that state in securing it against legislative or other usurpations, beyond the security possessed by other states, having no such provision.[1]
§ 537. On the other hand, if an appeal to the people, or a convention, is to be called only at great distances of time, it will afford no redress for the most pressing mischiefs. And if the measures, which are supposed to be infractions of the constitution, enjoy popular favour, or combine extensive private interests, or have taken root in the habit of the government, it is obvious, that the chances of any effectual redress will be essentially diminished.[2]
§ 538. But a more conclusive objection is, that the decisions upon all such appeals would not answer the purpose of maintaining, or restoring the constitutional equilibrium of the government. The remarks of the Federalist, on this subject, are so striking, that they scarcely admit of abridgment without impairing their force:We have seen, that the tendency of republican governments is to aggrandizement of the legislature at the expense of the other departments. The appeals to the people, therefore, would usually be made by the executive and judiciary departments. But whether made by one or the other, would each side enjoy equal advantages on the trial? Let us view their different situations. The members of the executive and judiciary departments are few in number, and can be personally known to a small part
