only of the people. The latter, by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too tar removed from the people to share much in their professions. The former are generally objects of jealousy; and their administration is always liable to be discoloured and rendered unpopular. The members of the legislative department, on the other hand, are numerous. They are distributed and dwell among the people at large. Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance, embrace a great proportion of the most influential part of the society. The nature of their public trust implies a personal weight with the people, and that they are more immediately the confidential guardians of their rights and liberties. With these advantages it can hardly be supposed, that the adverse party would have an equal chance of a favourable issue. But the legislative party would not only be able to plead their case most successfully with the people; they would probably be constituted themselves the judges. The same influence, which had gained them an election into the legislature, would gain them a seat in the convention. If this should not be the case with all, it would probably be the case with many, and pretty certainly with those leading characters, on whom every thing depends in such bodies. The convention, in short, would be composed chiefly of men, who had been, or who actually were, or who expected to be, members of the department, whose conduct was arraigned. They would consequently be parties to the very question to be decided by them.[1]
- ↑ The Federalist, No. 48.—The truth of this reasoning, as well as
