CH. X.]
THE SENATE.
271
execution thereof.[1] The decision, however, turned upon another point, viz., that a senator was not an impeachable officer.[2]
§ 801. As it is declared in one clause of the constitution, that "judgment, in cases of impeachment, shall not extend further, than a removal from office, and disqualification to hold any office of honour, trust, or profit, under the United States;" and in another clause, that "the president, vice president, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanours;" it would seem to follow, that the senate, on the conviction, were bound, in all cases, to enter a judgment of removal from office, though it has a discretion, as to inflicting the punishment of disqualification.[3] If, then, there must be a judgment of removal from office, it would seem to follow, that the constitution contemplated, that the party w as still in office at the time of the impeachment. If he was not, his offence was still liable to be tried and punished in the ordinary tribunals of justice. And it might be argued with some force, that it would be a vain exercise of authority to try a delinquent for an impeachable offence, when the most important object, for which the remedy was given, was no longer necessary, or attainable. And although a judgment of disqualification might still be pronounced, the language of the constitution- ↑ See Senate Journal, 14th Jan. 1799; 4 Tucker's Black. Comm. App. 57, 58.
- ↑ Sergeant on Const. Law, ch. 29, p. 363.
- ↑ Upon the impeachment and conviction of John Pickering (12th of March, 1804,) the only punishment awarded by the senate was a removal from office. See also Blount's Trial, 64 to 66; id. 79, 82, 83, (Philad. 1799;) Sergeant on Const. Law, ch. 29, p. 364.
