may create some doubt, whether it can be pronounced without being coupled with a removal from office.[1] There is also much force in the remark, that an impeachment is a proceeding purely of a political nature. It is not se much designed to punish an offender, as to secure the state against gross official misdemeanors. It touches neither his person, nor his property; but simply divests him of his political capacity.[2]
§ 802. The other point is one of more difficulty. In the argument upon Blount's impeachment, it was pressed with great earnestness, that there is not a syllable in the constitution, which confines impeachments to official acts, and it is against the plainest dictates of common sense,, that such restraint should be imposed upon it. Suppose a judge should countenance, or aid insurgents in a meditated conspiracy or insurrection against the government. This is not a judicial act; and yet it ought certainly to be impeachable. He may be called upon to try the very persons, whom he has aided.[3] Suppose a judge or other officer to receive a bribe not connected with his judicial office; could he be entitled to any public confidence? Would not these reasons for his removal be just as strong, as if it were a case of an official bribe? The argument on the other side was, that the power of impeachment was strictly confined to civil officers of the United States, and this necessarily implied, that it must be limited to malconduct in office.[4]
- ↑ See Blount's Trial, 47, 48; id. 64 to 68, (Philad. 1799;) id. 82.
- ↑ Mr. Bayard. Blount's Trial, 28, (Philad. 1799.) See id. 80, 81.
- ↑ Blount's Trial, 39, 40, (Phila. 1799;) id. 80.
- ↑ Blount's Trial, 46 to 49; id. 62, 64 to 68, (Philadelphia, 1799.)—William Blount was expelled from the senate a few days before this impeachment, (being then a member,) and on that occasion he was, by a resolution of the senate,[a 1] declared to be "guilty of a high misde-
- ↑ Yeas, 25; Nay, 1.
